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A WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL

JANUARY, 1984

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
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JANUARY, 1984
VOLUME 83 NUMBER 489

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The conflict in Central America, political changes in South America and superpower strategies in the region are covered in the February issue. Topics include:

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by ENRIQUE BALOYRA, University of North Carolina

Honduras and Nicaragua

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Current History

JANUARY, 1984

VOL. 83, NO. 489

The continuing crisis in the Middle East is discussed in the 8 articles in this issue. The complexities of the situation are pointed out in the lead article, which notes that the "Reagan administration's insistence on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is at best an expression of political-diplomatic necessity, not necessarily a statement of an obtainable result. It would be far worse if the administration were to believe what it says. . . ."

United States Policy in the Middle East

BY ROBERT G. NEUMANN

Director of Middle East Programs, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University

UNITED States diplomacy has been active in the Middle East since the end of World War I. At that time, President Woodrow Wilson sent a commission (King-Crane)¹ to the Middle East in order to examine the probable consequences of the British Balfour Declaration of 1917, which had promised a "Jewish Homeland in Palestine." The King-Crane Commission reported accurately that considerable trouble and resistance from the Arab population of Palestine were to be expected; and since such a report did not fit into American policy, the King-Crane report was well forgotten and has remained of interest only to historical scholars.

World War II created greater interest in the Middle East. The horrible atrocities committed by the Nazis against the Jewish people in Europe became known to a wide public only at the end of the war; and there was general compassion for the survivors of the holocaust and sympathy for their desire to establish a Jewish homeland where they could be safe from further persecution. The British mandate over Palestine ended on May 15, 1948; and when the independent state of Israel was proclaimed, both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the new republic the same day, May 18, 1948. Israel's war of independence against a combination of Arab armies was largely fought with weapons from Communist Czechoslova-

kia.² However, the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc later switched sides and the United States remained the principal supporter of Israel.

Having thus plunged, willingly or not, into the middle of a protracted conflict, the United States felt, justifiably, that it had an obligation as well as an opportunity to move the warring parties toward peace. At the same time, the Arabs realized that the United States, the only world power with influence on both sides of the battle lines, was the only party that might be able to bring peace to the area.

The subsequent period has, therefore, seen many examples of American diplomatic initiatives, none of which were truly successful. The diplomatic shuttles by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1973 succeeded only because they had limited objectives, which the skill of the Secretary of State brought to fruition. Broader American diplomatic peace efforts were marked either by failure or by premature elation; witness the Camp David agreement of 1978. The agreement is still hailed in the United States as a great American success, but it was never regarded as such in the Arab world and has lost its luster even in Egyptian eyes.

The intentions were different. Even during his initial election campaign, President Jimmy Carter had advocated a comprehensive peace in the Middle East and later spent a considerable portion of his energy on that project. Peace was to be achieved at the Camp David conference, after the startling journey of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem. Sadat made this spectacular gesture to convince the Israelis that peace with an Arab country was possible. He believed that he had the Arab prestige to move in that direction

¹Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1982), p. 12.

²Arnold Krammer, *The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc 1947-53* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1979), pp. 28, 54ff.

because the 1973 war had been almost successful for the Egyptian and allied Arab armies. True, in the end Israel prevailed, largely because of last-minute American assistance, but Egyptian arms had acquitted themselves with considerable honor.

Unfortunately Sadat's magnificent, broad gesture was met in Israel by Prime Minister Menachem Begin's narrow conception. Begin was determined not to give Sadat what he really wanted and what he needed if he were to return to the Arab fold in triumph: namely, the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan River.

What came out of Camp David instead was not one agreement but two. One, a bilateral peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. The second, more general agreement stipulated only a vaguely defined autonomy regime for the occupied area on the West Bank as a "transitional arrangement." But to what goal this arrangement was to transit was never clarified; it was never defined by the parties.³ To be sure, the Camp David agreement included a reference to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which provides for the "withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories"; hence it is clear that both the United States and Egypt understood the agreement to mean a return of the occupied areas to some form of Arab control. But even before the Camp David meetings and even more emphatically thereafter, Prime Minister Begin made it clear that he and his government regarded the West Bank and Gaza as well as East Jerusalem as "liberated" and not "occupied" areas, to which Resolution 242 therefore did not apply.⁴ Although this interpretation was wholly novel, unacceptable to any country in the world other than Israel, and not the meaning of Resolution 242 intended by the previous Israeli government that negotiated the resolution, the decision of the Israeli government remained unchanged. Subsequent negotiations on the autonomy provisions remained stillborn and are unlikely to be revived.

In Arab eyes, the Camp David agreement was and has remained a severe setback; it separated the strongest Arab country, Egypt, from the rest of the Arab fold, destabilized those always quarrelsome countries, and hinted at the unwelcome prospect that overwhelming Israeli military might force one Arab country after the other to cut a "Camp David" of its own with Israel, each one in a progressively weaker position, thus establishing Israel's supremacy. This perspective, neither well known nor understood in the United States, should be kept in mind in view of what happened later, in 1983, in Lebanon.

³Robert G. Neumann, "The Political Determinants of Stability: The Middle East after Camp David: Perils and Opportunities," *Washington Quarterly White Paper*, spring, 1979, pp. 30ff.

⁴Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 327.

The administration of President Ronald Reagan began its Middle East policy under the guidance of its first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, who strove vaguely for some sort of "strategic consensus." Haig knew enough about the Middle East to realize that an agreement between Arabs and Israelis on a common defense against the Soviet Union was not possible. But he thought that official or unofficial agreements with each individual Middle East country concerned might lead to the same result. Actually, a consensus between countries who could not agree on anything else was out of the question, especially since the Arabs and the Israelis regarded one another, and not the Soviet Union, as their principal opponent.

REAGAN'S PLAN

After Haig left office, a greater sense of reality prevailed in Washington, leading to a significant speech by President Reagan on September 1, 1982, that dropped the "strategic consensus" idea and instead proposed (like the Nixon and Carter administrations) a comprehensive plan for the Middle East. Ronald Reagan's ideas were not new, but since they came from the President they deserved particular attention. Again, peace was to be based on Resolution 242 and recognition of the rights of the Arab population in the occupied territories, and "autonomy" for these territories in "association with Jordan" was proposed.

Europeans, Palestinians and other Arabs have criticized the Reagan declaration because it did not affirm the principle of "self-determination" for the Palestinians, which the United States had espoused ever since the Fourteen Points were announced by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918. However, the Israeli objections (shared by the Israeli opposition and the Begin government) against a Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan had caused the President to adopt a compromise formula. Perhaps because of the compromise, this formula achieved a wide degree of approval in the United States, including much of the American Jewish community. The President also found varying measures of support in the Arab world, especially in Jordan. However, Prime Minister Begin rejected it harshly and instantly.

King Hussein of Jordan saw an opportunity in the Reagan plan. So, with some reservations, did Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat. In several protracted meetings, they sought a negotiation formula that they could accept and that would support the Reagan plan. Unfortunately, the entire energy and resources of American diplomacy became concentrated on the need to evacuate all foreign forces, Israeli, Syrian and PLO, from Lebanon. The rest of the Reagan initiative was not implemented. In personal letters to King Hussein, President Reagan had promised that he would do everything in his power to bring about negotiations on the Palestinian

problem but, in effect, Hussein and Arafat were left alone. No doubt, President Reagan was serious in his assurance but could not credibly promise the performance of a third party, Israel, unless that party was a mere satellite (which Israel is not, even though many Arabs cannot be convinced of that). In the absence of American pressure on Israel, Jordan and the PLO were unable to deliver a common negotiating position. After Yasir Arafat's modest proposal was turned down by the PLO executive council, King Hussein had to withdraw his initiative. It was inconceivable for Jordan, which had always emphasized that it was not "Palestine" (in contrast to Israel's propaganda) to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians without their consent.

Why the United States concentration on Lebanon? In part, it was "bureaucratic." Every country's bureaucracy has an unerring instinct to plunge into the immediate and operational rather than the long-range and speculative. In part, the United States government was imbued by a series of wholly unfounded, over-optimistic assessments. The basis of that optimism was never explained. It clearly had no foundation in fact.

The latest of Lebanon's many bloody civil wars began in 1975. By 1976, the dominant but by then minority Maronite community found itself in great difficulty and called for Syrian assistance, which was granted. Hence President Hafez Assad was invited into Lebanon at that time by the Lebanese government; in defense of the Christian Maronites. Syrian sympathies later shifted to the other side, but Assad had long felt that Lebanon and Syria should be closely associated. That he would see little need for withdrawal should therefore have been predictable.

The gradual flooding of Palestinian fighters into Lebanon had a different origin, namely, the respective waves of refugees after each Arab-Israeli war and especially after the bloody "Black September" of 1970 in Jordan, when the PLO tried to take over that country and King Hussein and his army ejected them. For its part, the weak government in Lebanon could not resist the PLO's gradual creation of a virtual state within a state; thus the PLO made Lebanon its main base of operation against Israel.

PLO raids and attacks on northern Israel (Galilee) were the result. After repeated and increasingly violent Israeli counter-raids and bombardments, United States Ambassador Philip Habib was able to negotiate a cease-fire in August, 1981. For all practical purposes, the Israelis and the PLO were parties to the cease-fire although neither admitted that (the Israelis claim to have made the agreement with Lebanon, and the PLO with the United Nations). In fact, however, this was one cease-fire that held. Thereafter, no PLO attack occurred against Galilee from Lebanon.

In May, 1982, however, Israel conducted a massive bombardment of Beirut in declared retaliation for the assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in

London, even though the British authorities had quickly identified the anti-PLO Palestinian terrorist group of Abu Nidal as the perpetrators. In reprisal, PLO rocket attacks on Galilee followed; these caused few Israeli casualties but furnished the pretext for Israel's invasion of Lebanon, including the attack on Beirut. Israel expected quick success and the complete destruction of the PLO's political and military machinery. Instead, this became the Israelis' longest and costliest war, and internal resistance to that war grew within Israel.

Still, the United States pursued its Lebanon priority policy with mediation and shuttles. After a long delay, Secretary of State George Shultz finally took over direct negotiations with Israel and Lebanon and obtained a withdrawal agreement on May 17, 1983. The terms of that agreement included a quasi-peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon with embassy-like liaison offices and trade provisions. The agreement gave Syria the opportunity to make itself the spokesman of Arab opposition against another separate peace; Syria thus assumed the leadership of the anti-Phalange forces in Lebanon. The Israelis unilaterally withdrew from the Beirut area and from the volatile Shuf Mountains to the Awali River, which they hoped to be able to defend with fewer losses. Their withdrawal from the Shuf created a vacuum, because Phalange forces had been encouraged by Israel to enter that region earlier; thus, when Israel withdrew, a particularly murderous phase of the fighting between the Druse and the Phalange exploded.

The regular Lebanese army, newly reestablished, equipped and trained by the United States, also entered the fray. Considering how little time it had had to renew its existence, it did not give a bad account of itself and, on the whole, held together (except that several hundred Druse officers and soldiers, including the army chief of staff, at their own request, were "furloughed" to join their own people).

The only winner was Syria, with a greatly reinforced position in the Middle East; in fact, voices in Israel suggested that Israel's security might be relatively enhanced if a deal could be cut between Israel and Syria. Had not the Israeli-Syrian border been the safest border of all ever since the 1973 Israeli-Syrian armistice agreement?

American Marines, together with their French, British and Italian partners, entered Lebanon as a multinational peacekeeping force in September, 1982, with the agreement of the Lebanese government and the broad approval of the Lebanese people. But when Amin Gemayel's government failed to move toward national reconciliation and power sharing and when the civil war erupted, the United States and eventually France were increasingly perceived as partisans rather than as peacekeepers.

When a military presence is undertaken under one

set of assumptions and the situation on the ground subsequently changes so radically that those earlier assumptions are inoperative, a nation's foreign policy is endangered. Two factors brought this about in Lebanon. First, Amin Gemayel was never accepted by the Phalange forces with the same obedience that his assassinated brother Bashir had inspired. In particular, the Phalange's founder and still dominant personality, Pierre Gemayel (Amin's father), opposed all compromise that would appreciably weaken Phalange and Maronite domination. The Maronites had long convinced themselves, the French and finally the Americans, that they were a Christian, hence by definition pro-Western, fortress in a Muslim, hence unfriendly, and at least potentially pro-Soviet sea. Therefore, the Maronites reasoned, the West owed them support in its own interest.

Second, in the tense atmosphere of a deadly civil war, the Phalange had further convinced itself that it did not need to make concessions because the United States was supporting it. United States special envoy Robert McFarlane's pressure on the Phalange to accept significant power sharing was therefore dismissed as window dressing. The increasingly vocal anti-Syrian and anti-Soviet oratory coming from Washington only confirmed that impression. President Amin Gemayel's statement that the withdrawal of all foreign forces deserved priority over power distribution⁵ was a further indication that the Phalange leadership did not want to change, since there was clearly no way in which the United States or anyone else could force an Israeli or a Syrian withdrawal.

Where does that leave United States foreign policy in the Middle East? Only one answer is possible—in shambles. Washington's Lebanon priority, not to say obsession, has led to a dead end. The United States unintended but nevertheless observable partisanship in favor of the Phalange-dominated Beirut government has been unable to reverse a course of events in which the anti-Phalangist forces and Syria, their mentor and protector, are clearly winning. And with the accretion of Syria's power, Soviet influence and prestige have risen sharply.

How can the United States reverse that trend? For all practical purposes, it has preciously few options. In November, it increased its military force off the coast of Lebanon and became more openly partisan. Although its air strikes against Syrian targets in Lebanon in early December, 1983, did not involve the United States in open warfare, such a course could embroil American forces with Syria.* And Syria would prob-

ably involve the Soviet Union. Even if Syria were reluctant to do so, the Soviet Union would very likely act on its own. In a region only 150 miles from its own territory, the Soviet Union would hold a clear advantage. Fortunately, there is little indication that the Reagan administration seriously contemplates such a high-risk adventure, which would also heighten tension within the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance to the breaking point. In any event, Congress would not permit such a strategy.

The other option is to redress the strategic balance in the war by "coordination" with the Israeli army, which may induce Israel to reenter the evacuated areas of Lebanon.**

This second option is almost as impractical as the first. Public and political opinion in Israel has increasingly grasped the fact that the invasion of Lebanon was a mistake. The invasion seriously weakened Israel; never before had Israel's government enjoyed less than quasi-total national unity behind its armed forces. Prime Minister Begin's departure from office in a state of deep depression further served to underline Israel's predicament, now deepened by the worst economic crisis in Israeli history.

In that frame of mind, a new and weak Israeli government of uncertain cohesion and longevity would not soon wish to return to the killing grounds of Lebanon. An Israeli return to Lebanon would constitute a belated victory for former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, with grave consequences for the future of Israel and American-Israeli relations. Even the appearance of an American-Israeli strategic alliance may force the most moderate Arab states into the opposite camp.

What of the original Reagan peace plan? There are some indications of a flickering interest on the part of King Hussein and Yasir Arafat. But Arafat's future is in doubt. As for King Hussein, he will certainly have to take note of Syria's new power and may be reluctant to challenge it. Even if the Jordanian monarch were to take up his previous initiative, he would wonder whether the American government would be in a position to force a more conciliatory attitude from a politically embattled Israel.

To sum up, a little over a year after President Reagan's September 1, 1982, speech, United States foreign policy has been reduced to a frantic search for ways to extricate the United States from an involvement in Lebanon that has become untenable and has inflicted heavy casualties. The French, who have also taken serious losses in Lebanon, will undoubtedly seek ways of

(Continued on page 39)

*At this writing, no direct confrontation has occurred.

**On November 29, President Reagan and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir agreed to set up a joint United States-Israeli committee to coordinate military planning.

⁵President Amin Gemayel's interview with Flora Lewis, *The New York Times*, October 3, 1983, pp. 1, 5.

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"In a decade of civil strife, Lebanon has suffered not only the extreme fragmentation of its political order, but the dissolution of its society. . . . As modern history demonstrates, self-centered factional groups can somehow be forced to continue living together, and pacts, contracts, or agreements can create new state organs. But how can human beings reconstruct a society?"

Prospects for a Unified Lebanon

BY NIKOLA B. SCHAHGALDIAN

Associate Staff Member, Department of Political Science, Rand Corporation

ON September 25, a cease-fire succeeded in putting a stop, at least temporarily, to the otherwise inconclusive hostilities between Christian forces and Druse militias in the Shuf mountains of Lebanon. Now Lebanon's feuding factions and their foreign sponsors face the far more difficult task of reconciliation.

On the surface, the central government of President Amin Gemayel and Lebanon's homegrown armies have willingly entered negotiations that would ultimately try to work out a new basis for resolving the tiny republic's critical problems.¹ The new urgency attached to reconciliation efforts is prompted by several factors. In the first place, Lebanon's politicians and warlords seem to realize that the stark alternative to a "political dialogue" among them may well be permanent lawlessness or civil war and the consequent demise of the last vestiges of Lebanon's sovereignty—a situation in which no one's political future can be certain.

The current search for a peaceful solution also reflects a reversal of emphasis by the Beirut government and the United States. Their previous attempts gave priority to resolving Lebanon's disputes with its Syrian and Israeli neighbors. During 1983, joint efforts at domestic reconciliation took a back seat to attempts to get Syrian and Israeli troops out of Lebanon. But with the failure of these efforts and the painful realization that questions of foreign occupation will not be re-

solved in the near future, both the Lebanese government and its American friends recognized the urgent need to unify Lebanon.

While many attribute Lebanon's internal problems to others—Israelis, Syrians and Palestinians—few would deny that no external power can resolve the problems of sociopolitical fragmentation and communal identity that have haunted Lebanon throughout its modern history.

In Lebanon, the most important fact of human geography is the diversity of religious sects or confessional groups.² Conflict among them and between different factions within a particular sect have been acrimonious for many centuries. In time, they preserved and strengthened a deep sense of factional identity; religious cleavages gradually acquired communal colorings and contributed to the emergence of many distinct and often antagonistic Christian and Muslim groups.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the European powers sought their own ends by intervening frequently in the political life of the country, further exacerbating relations among Lebanon's factional groups. European influence also contributed to the emergence of differing political outlooks and objectives among the diverse communities.³

The most striking example of this was France's protection of the Maronites. This Catholic community—still the largest and the most powerful among Lebanon's Christians—had moved into Lebanon in the seventh century and defended its new home successfully in the following centuries. Traditionally viewing themselves as an outpost of Christian civilization in the otherwise Muslim Middle East, the Maronites aligned and identified themselves with the West, particularly with France. This Catholic power, in turn, cemented its political ties by promoting Maronite interests in the area. France's protective relationship also extended to Lebanon's third largest Christian group—the Melchite, the Greek Catholic, community. This traditionally well-educated and urban group was originally part of the Eastern Orthodoxy but had entered into communion

¹The September 25, 1983, cease-fire is by some accounts the 179th cease-fire in Lebanon in the past 10 years. Looking at it differently, 178 previous cease-fires have collapsed.

²Relatively recent studies of the Lebanese sects include Halim Barakat, "Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic," *Middle East Journal*, summer, 1973, pp. 301–318; and Joseph Chamie, "Religious Groups in Lebanon: A Descriptive Investigation," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (1980), no. 2, pp. 175–187.

³Studies of Europe's role in the modern history of Lebanon include John P. Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1914* (London: Ithaca Press, 1977); Philip K. Hitti, *Lebanon in History* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1957); and Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

with the Papacy in the early eighteenth century. In political matters, the Melchites concurred with the Maronites (they continue to do so to this date) and maintained special ties with France, but the bonds were not so strong.

In an attempt to counterbalance French influence over the Maronites, the British assiduously cultivated the closely knit and post-Islamic Druse community. Like the Maronites, this warlike sect had developed its own factional identity during the eleventh century when its members embraced their present faith. Anglo-French colonial rivalries in the region, in turn, exacerbated the already antagonistic relations between the Druse and the Maronites and helped to provoke the widespread civil strife between the two groups that periodically plagued Lebanon in the nineteenth century.

France and England were not alone in their eagerness to intrigue in Lebanon. Competing with them for influence was Czarist Russia, which established protective ties with the Greek Orthodox community: the second largest Christian group in Lebanon.⁴ The Austrians, in the meantime, competed with the French in winning the sympathy of the Greek, Syrian, and Armenian Catholics. The Americans, who had a more benign role in Lebanon than the Europeans, looked after the Protestants.

The Orthodox Muslims, the Sunnis, who had been the dominant group in the coastal areas of Lebanon since the fourteenth century, tended to enjoy their status as adherents to the state religion of the Ottoman Sultanate and maintained close ties with their Sunni coreligionists in Syria and elsewhere in the region. Among Lebanon's major confessional groups, the Shia Muslims provided the sole exception to the tradition. Long persecuted by their Sunni Muslim rulers, the members of this community neither sought nor welcomed ties with foreign powers, whether Christian or Muslim. Thus, the various confessional groups who were destined to make up the Lebanese mosaic in the twentieth century reached the modern age as discordant entities with conflicting values and political orientations.

⁴For a discussion of this topic, see Derek Hopwood, *Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

⁵The political intricacies that led to the establishment of Greater Lebanon are best discussed in Spagnolo, *op. cit.*, and Jan Karl Tanenbaum, *France and the Middle East, 1914-1920* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978).

⁶At present, Armenians constitute the fourth largest Christian community in Lebanon. The ethnically non-Arab Armenians are the survivors of Armenian massacres at the hands of successive Turkish governments before, during, and after World War I. They arrived in Lebanon en masse in the early 1920's.

⁷Lebanon's confessional politics in the mandate period are carefully discussed by Stephen H. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate* (New York: Octagon Books, 1972).

THE MANDATE LEGACY

Many of Lebanon's current problems can be traced back to 1920, when France created the State of Greater Lebanon and came to administer it under the League of Nations mandate.⁵ The boundaries of the new state (which coincide with today's boundaries) differed considerably from those of earlier times. France's decision almost doubled Lebanon's territory, to 4,000 square miles, and increased its population by one-half—from 400,000 to 600,000. But what the country gained in area, it lost in cohesion. Thus to Mount Lebanon, the traditional home of the Maronites and the Druse, were added the Bekaa valley with a Shia majority and a large plurality of Greek Catholics, the coastal towns where the Sunnis and the Greek Orthodox predominated, the southern region inhabited by the Shiites and the northern region, where the Sunnis formed the majority. Lebanon lost its internal equilibrium, although geographically and economically it became more viable. The new state was preeminently a country of minorities; no one community, including the Maronites, formed more than 30 percent of the total population.

Despite this shortcoming, the Maronites, who had in effect been rewarded for their faithful allegiance to France, enthusiastically welcomed the new arrangement. Most Sunni Muslims, on the other hand, favored the idea of an Arab nation and an Arab Syrian state. Fearing permanent separation from other parts of the Muslim Arab world, the Sunnis opposed their inclusion in Lebanon. Instead, they preferred annexing Lebanon to the newly created Syrian state, where their Sunni coreligionists formed the majority population.

As for the Greek Catholics and the newly arrived Christian Armenians, they concurred with the Maronites.⁶ In contrast, the Greek Orthodox were much less sure of their stand, while many of their intellectuals supported the pan-Arab orientation of the Sunnis. The Druse and the Shiites tended to share the ambivalence of the Orthodox Christians, but were not entirely unhappy with the creation of Greater Lebanon.

Under the mandate, the French held the key to the nature of relations among Lebanon's diverse communities; and as France's policy changed, the relationship among the communities changed.⁷ The refusal of large numbers of individuals within each group, especially among the Sunnis, to submit themselves to the Maronite-dominated "national" authority in Beirut, significantly inhibited national integration and strained the country's political system. The French, meanwhile, did little to foster loyalty to the Lebanese entity, and territorial national consciousness remained beyond the comprehension of Lebanon's inhabitants.

Paradoxically, as the movement toward independence grew during World War II, Lebanon remained a hodgepodge of confessional groups with persisting

communal divisions or supernatural loyalties. This situation contained the seeds of a widespread factional conflict that might have been as tragic as that of 1860, when thousands of civilian Lebanese were massacred in intercommunal violence. The conflict, however, did not break out, and when the French left the country in 1946, there came into being an independent Lebanon with a government that satisfied most Lebanese factions.

THE NATIONAL PACT

How did this happen? The answer lay in the ingenious yet flawed formula of the National Pact, by which Lebanon's communities arrived at a basis for national and interconfessional cooperation. Contrary to its name, the National Pact was not a written document but, rather, a verbal agreement between the traditional elites of the two major sects: the Maronites and the Sunnis. According to its unwritten terms, the Christians, especially the Maronites, agreed to forego dependence on France as their protector and accepted the Arab character of Lebanon, which would cooperate with all the Arab states but would not take sides in Arab disputes. Similarly, the Muslims agreed to recognize Lebanon as a fully independent state and cease working for a merger with other Arab states, particularly Syria. The agreement also stipulated that all the political and administrative offices within the structure of the state would be proportionally distributed among the recognized confessional groups. In keeping with the spirit of this reconciliation, the interests of the remaining major religious groups were also taken into account. Thus, Lebanon's President was always to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite. Key ministries were also reserved for particular religious groups: the Foreign Minister was always to be a Christian and usually a Maronite, the Defense Minister a Druse, and so on. In a similar fashion, the Christians, who were believed at the time to number slightly more than the Muslims, received a slightly larger representation in the Parliament: six Christians for every five non-Christians.

Remarkable as these agreements were, the National Pact signified a confirmation rather than an abandonment of the tradition of dividing political offices among the factional elites. Thus, this balancing act was not only inevitably unstable because it established a government based largely on a spoils system, but because it effectively forced many of the society's future economic, social and political struggles to take place

within the narrow boundaries of the confessional framework.⁸ As a result, whereas the Pact guaranteed the physical survival of an independent Lebanese entity, it added to the confusion of national identity among its inhabitants. Despite its flaws, however, this system functioned remarkably well. It made possible an environment in which Lebanon, alone in the Arab world, could tolerate diverse political parties, conduct regular elections, enjoy an unrestricted press, and make a market economy successful.

By 1958, however, Lebanese politics was once again unravelling, and a major challenge to the National Pact arrangements erupted in the form of civil war.⁹ The factional polarization in Lebanon was caused partly by economic disparity between the Christians and Muslims and the growing Muslim population that threatened the supremacy of the Christians. More significantly, perhaps, the crisis was a response to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's militant pan-Arabist crusade. As a result of his inflammatory urging, the monarchical regime in Iraq had been overthrown, and Jordan's King Hussein was saved only with the help of the British forces. In Lebanon, many Muslims, especially Sunnis, who were influenced by Nasser's pan-Arabism, opposed Maronite President Camille Chamoun's efforts to create a modern political organization that would undermine the traditional factional leaders. And when Chamoun sought a second term, a combination of Sunnis, some Shias and a Christian group headed by Suleiman Franjeh (who later became President of Lebanon) took up arms against the government. Meanwhile, the Lebanese army, fearing its own breakdown along factional lines, preferred to remain neutral. During the ensuing civil war, the reigning President was forced to step aside in favor of Fuad Shehab, a Maronite general, who was more willing to meet Muslim demands for a larger share of economic and political power. The confessional structure and the Christians' overall political supremacy were also saved by the intervention of United States Marines, who landed in Beirut on July 15, 1958, at Chamoun's request.

The 1958 war left a mixed legacy in Lebanon. Resenting the growing militancy of the Muslim population, some Maronites, together with many other Christians, began to look to Israel as a future ally. The Muslims, on the other hand, became more assertive and consolidated their ties with the neighboring Arab states. Moreover, by leaving the confessional balance of power essentially intact, the 1958 civil war reaffirmed the inability of Lebanon's political system to adapt to shifting power relations.

By the late 1960's, a more radicalized generation of mostly Muslim but also Christian leaders emerged on the political scene. Challenging the positions of their respective leaders, these leftist forces worked outside the political system and called for a fundamental re-

⁸Malcolm H. Kerr, "Political Decisionmaking in a Confessional Democracy," in Leonard Binder, ed., *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 187-213.

⁹For an objective discussion of 1958 events, see Fahim I. Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1961).

distribution of economic and political power. This new phenomenon further strained the already precarious sectarian balance.¹⁰

THE PALESTINIAN CATALYST

More important, the entrance of armed Palestinian Arabs into Lebanon provided the catalyst that escalated the violence and brought the country to the edge of destruction.¹¹ Although the majority of Palestinian refugees had lived in Lebanon since the late 1940's, they became a potent political force only after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. And when Palestinian guerrillas began raiding Israeli settlements from Lebanese territory, the Beirut government could neither stop the attacks nor prevent Israel's frequent retaliations. In 1970-1971, armed Palestinian groups were expelled from Jordan and moved en masse to Lebanon. Much to the dismay of Christians, the growth in Palestinian activity deepened the involvement of various Arab countries in Lebanon's domestic affairs.

As young Palestinians rushed to join guerrilla organizations in the early 1970's, Lebanese attempts to curb the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) were prevented by Syria. This led to an arrangement in 1973 by which the PLO was allowed a greater freedom of action in Lebanon. The Sunnis and various leftist groups, believing that an anti-Zionist Lebanon would strengthen their ties with neighboring Arab states, generally supported the PLO's use of Lebanon as its prime base of operations against Israel. On the other hand, the Christians along with many Shiites were unwilling to suffer Israeli retaliation for Palestinian attacks.¹²

Meanwhile, the guerrillas defied the weak Beirut government and gradually began acting as a state within a state in Lebanon. They expanded their control over large areas of Lebanon (including parts of Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and the south), and began openly supporting and training some of the radical Lebanese Muslim forces. These activities further exacerbated the factional feuds and galvanized the opposing militias to action. In 1975, the attempted assassination of Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Phalangist party and militia, led to retaliation against the PLO and to a full-scale civil war: Before it was over, 60,000 people were killed and many more thousands were left homeless.

The civil war precipitated a political and geographic split reminiscent of the ragged patchwork of the pre-

1920 period. In the first place, the war resulted in the near collapse of state authority. The political paralysis of the Lebanese government and the destruction of its army contributed to the continuation of the anarchic domestic situation. As the government in Beirut ceased to exercise meaningful territorial control, Lebanon became a battleground for its much stronger Israeli and Syrian neighbors and their factional proxies.

Syria claimed that the Bekaa valley was vital to its security, and Israel made similar assertions about south Lebanon. Not surprisingly, these claims found some support among the warring Lebanese factions. Beirut became divided into Christian and Muslim zones. The Maronites set up an autonomous rule over a small area in Mount Lebanon and controlled the coastal strip to the north of Beirut. Further to the north was the stronghold of the Sunni Muslims, backed by Syria. Meanwhile, substantial parts of the country remained under the domination of Syria, which in the guise of an Arab League peacekeeping force, had entered Lebanon in June, 1976. The dismemberment of Lebanon continued in March, 1978, when Israel invaded south Lebanon. This prompted Israel's quixotic ally, ex-Major Saad Haddad, to declare the independence of a "Free Lebanon" in the Shia-populated areas along the Israeli border.

Domestic chaos continued unabated after 1978, and further violence between and within different combinations of factional groups destroyed much of Lebanon's economic infrastructure. Israel's second invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 appeared to give that country a chance to break out of this vicious circle. Exacting a heavy toll of human lives, the Israelis succeeded in destroying the Palestinian armed presence in south Lebanon and Beirut. But once Israel achieved its declared objective—the destruction of the PLO—it refused to leave Lebanese territory. Instead, Israel made the withdrawal of its forces conditional on a similar move by Syria. In the process, like the Syrians before them, the Israelis remained in Lebanon, effectively vaporizing their initial welcome among the largely Muslim population that continues to live under their control.

To be sure, much has changed in Lebanon in the past 12 months: for the first time since 1975 the Lebanese capital was reunited under the effective control of the Gemayel government; a newly constructed mixed Christian-Muslim Lebanese army of some

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¹⁰The most substantial studies of Lebanese politics before the 1975-1976 civil strife include Michael C. Hudson, *Precautious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon* (New York: Random House, 1968); Kamal S. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958-1976* (New York: Caravan Books, 1976); and Binder, *op. cit.*

¹¹Iliya Harik, *Lebanon: Anatomy of a Conflict* (American University Field Staff Reports, Asia Series, no. 49, 1981).

¹²By the mid-1970's, Israeli retaliation against the PLO attacks had devastated large areas in south Lebanon and caused the migration of 350,000 Shiites to Beirut.

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"The third phase of the Iraq-Iran war has been far less successful for the Iranians. Attempting to eliminate all remaining enclaves of Iraqi troops and taking the war into Iraq, the Iranians have launched a succession of major assaults. . . . In every case, the Iraqis have been able to . . . halt the attacks. . . . The result is a war of attrition in which the human and material resources of both states are being consumed."

The Iran–Iraq War

BY RICHARD COTTAM

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POSSIBLY no event in contemporary world affairs is so bewildering to outside observers as the war between Iran and Iraq. The conflict began in September, 1980, and is now in its fourth year. It has claimed thousands of lives and created well over a million refugees; it has cost the participants many billions of dollars in lost resources and revenues and has destroyed many dreams of a happier future. Furthermore, it is being fought in one of the world's most critical geopolitical arenas. Yet, for all that, it is only indirectly related to the great drama of the era, the Soviet–American cold war. In fact, possibly the most important lesson to be learned from the conflict is that superpower relations may no longer give primary definition to regional power conflicts, even in areas of major strategic concern.

In May, 1980, Tareq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, gave a speech in which he described conditions in Iran.¹ The picture he painted was one of military weakness, an economy near collapse, internal anarchy and a foreign policy in shambles. In so describing Iran, Aziz was replying to the charge from the Syrian–PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) camp that Iraq was throwing away the great opportunity the revolution presented of mobilizing Iran in an anti-Israeli front. His point was that so disorganized a state would be more a liability than an asset as an ally. But the speech helps place in perspective the Iraqi regime's view of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Iran four months before it attacked Iran. It was a view that incorporated perceptions both of threat and opportunity.

The threat can be seen in three forms. First, under the Shah Iran demonstrated how aggressive and powerful it could be. The Khomeini regime may be incapable of expansion, but in the future, a more efficient

and stable regime could be. Besides, the very anarchy in Iran was a danger. Competing factions could keep the border in turmoil and would be tempted to use demagogic appeals to Iranian popular enmity toward Iraq in their strategies to achieve or consolidate power.² This could lead to attacks on Iraq.

Second, Iran was closely associated with the regional enemies of Iraq and claimed that opposing Iraq was essential if the primary regional enemy, Israel, was ever to be contained. Thus, Iran was part of a dangerous and hostile alliance and was attempting to counter Iraqi efforts to present itself as the center of the struggle against Zionism and imperialism.

Third, the Iranian regime indeed represented a competing and very different revolutionary path. Khomeini was saying that Iraqi Baathists, attempting to present themselves as social revolutionaries dedicated to representing the socially deprived classes and to opposing the Zionist–imperialist conspiracy in the Middle East, were in fact the agents of that Zionist–imperialism and were utterly insincere in their social revolutionary pretensions. The stunning success Khomeini had in appealing to a sense of class deprivation was sufficient to alarm the most sanguine secular socialist. Khomeini articulated what many Arabs were thinking: secular nationalism has had its day and has failed miserably to achieve either its domestic or its foreign policy objectives. It was time to turn to a new elite which, true to a holistic Islamic view, would be able to achieve both social justice and the elimination of Zionist imperial exploitation.

But if the perceived threat was real and important in explaining the September, 1980, Iraq attack on Iran, the perceived opportunity was surely even greater. Given the Iraqi estimate of Iranian weakness, the opportunity obviously was there to regain lost Iraqi and Arab territory. However, initial Iraqi statements suggest that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was playing for much larger stakes. He not only renounced the Algiers Treaty of 1975 designating the thalweg of the Shatt al-Arab as the Iran–Iraq boundary but also insisted that the 1937 treaty that confirmed Arabistan

¹The Aziz speech is reprinted in its entirety in Tareq Y. Ismail, *Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), pp. 89–100.

²See Claudia Wright, "Neutral or Neutralized? Iraq, Iran and the Superpowers," in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, eds., *The Iran–Iraq War* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 176.

(the home of Iran's Arab minority) as an integral part of Iran no longer applied.³ He was therefore staking a claim to territories that had long been under at least nominal Iranian control. From the first few days of the conflict, Iraqi propaganda described the conflict as one between Arab and Iranian nationalism. Saddam Hussein was about to bring to the Arab nation a great victory and one that the Arabs, having suffered a long succession of humiliations, presumably would deeply appreciate.⁴ Surely now there would be no real contesting Hussein's preeminence among Arabs, and the Arab world would have a new and far more successful Nasser.*

Within days of the Iraqi attack, it was apparent that Hussein had miscalculated disastrously. His decision was a mistake of truly historic proportions. Whatever dreams he had entertained for himself, for Iraq, and for the Arab nation, were quickly demolished. The most he could hope for was political survival in an Iraq with diminished influence in an Arab world now more divided and more vulnerable than it had been. The Khomeini regime would not only survive, but the performance of the poorly trained Revolutionary Guard in the house by house defense of the city of Khurramshahr indicated a fierce devotion to Khomeini.⁵

The Khomeini regime had indeed lost support in Iran since early 1979. In fact, by September, 1980, when the Iraq attack occurred, the regime was probably down to its core support. It had lost the support of ethnic communities that adhere to Sunni Islam and was badly weakened in the large and important Turkish-speaking Azeri community. It had purged and hence alienated the large, secular-minded middle class. And it generated little strong support in Persian-speaking rural areas. Its intense support was mainly in the lower and lower middle class sections of Persian-speaking urban areas. But that support was maintained at a level of intensity that was genuinely astonishing. The Iranian regime was an example of authoritarian populism in which the base of support was a minority of the population, but one that was easily mobilizable and extraordinarily enthusiastic.

Military analysts tend after the fact to denigrate the training, the leadership and the strategy of the Iraqi military.⁶ But the real miscalculation was political. Con-

*Egypt's late President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

³For the texts of the Algiers Declaration and the 1937 protocols, see Tareq Y. Ismail, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-61.

⁴David B. Tinnin, "Iraq and the New Arab Alliance," *Fortune*, November 3, 1980, pp. 44-46.

⁵For an account of the Iranian military, see William F. Hickman, *Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982).

⁶See William O. Staudenmeir, "A Strategic Analysis," in Tahir-Kheli and Ayubi, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-50.

⁷For an account of the Iraqi Shia population in terms of political attitudes, see Hanna Batatu, "Iraq's Underground Shia Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects," *Middle East Journal*, autumn, 1981, pp. 578-594.

fident that the picture of Iran painted by Aziz was accurate, Hussein believed Iran would collapse into an anarchic situation that could easily lead to the disintegration of the state. The Iraqi military staff thus did not need to engage in the kind of preparation and planning that led to the early brilliant victories of the Egyptian military in 1973. Rather, a fairly modest move should have produced the desired political results.

Not only did this not occur but evidence mounted that the Khomeini regime would be strengthened by the attack. Thus it was Iraq that had to struggle against the prospect of political destabilization. Heavy sacrifices could not be demanded of the Iraqi population, in particular of its Shia majority, which provided the vast majority of the enlisted personnel of the military.⁷ Tactics could not be adopted that would risk the terrible level of casualties that the Iranian regime apparently could tolerate. And the regime had to beg for financial support from the oil-producing regimes of the Arabian peninsula to maintain the Iraqi standard of living. The consequence was a sluggish Iraqi military performance in the first phase of the war, in which Iraq's superiority in weaponry was most pronounced. Iraq was hence denied success even for its most minimal military objectives. After a few weeks, the war moved into its first prolonged stalemate. Iranian cities and Iranian civilians, a great many of them ethnic Arabs, suffered terribly, and the ranks of refugees swelled toward the million mark. But a working relationship developed between the various elements of the Iranian military, the professional soldiers and the soldiers of the revolution, and the Iranian military began to develop the capability to move onto the offensive.

For Khomeini, there was nothing mysterious about the Iraqi attack. Khomeini saw his role as a divinely appointed leader of the oppressed peoples of the world in their struggle with the oppressors, to demonstrate that the oppressors lacked the ability to persist in their exploitation. To accomplish this, Khomeini has had to restore a true understanding of the Koran and create the government called for in Islam.

With the certainty of the moral absolutist, Khomeini has identified his enemies. They include especially the two great oppressor states, the United States and the Soviet Union, and two particularly reprehensible usurper states, South Africa and Israel. But the oppressors' success also extends deeply into the oppressed world. It incorporates those secular nationalists who sometimes appear to oppose the oppressors but in fact have embraced their culture. It incorporates as well the ruling elements of many of the established conservative regimes in the oppressed world. In the Middle East these include the regimes of Egypt, the Sudan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms. That the secular nationalist regime of Iraq could break

with other secular nationalists and join hands with traditional regimes was only to be expected. All are ultimately beholden to the oppressors.⁸

Iran had humiliated one of the great oppressors, the United States, by taking its diplomats hostage and had administered a stinging rebuke to the other oppressor, the Soviet Union, for its occupation of Afghanistan. Khomeini recognizes that there is a struggle among oppressors for hegemonic primacy. But he also believes that when confronted with a serious challenge from the oppressed peoples, the great oppressors are likely to cooperate to meet the challenge. For Khomeini, the Iraqi attack was ordered and orchestrated by the United States. The Soviet role, especially in the early stages, was secondary. But as the tide of the conflict moved in Iran's favor, Soviet assistance to Iraq became more evident. Iraq's attack thus was seen as a major conspiracy orchestrated against Iran by the most dangerous of the oppressor powers, the United States, but also including the Soviet Union.⁹

Iran's Arab allies tended to view the Iraq attack in ways that both paralleled and ran counter to the Iranian view. They agreed that the attack served the purposes of the United States and Israel very well and amounted to at least a de facto collusion with the forces of imperialism and Zionism. But they understood far better than Khomeini the intimate relationship of the attack and inter-Arab rivalry and conflict. And they believed that the Soviet leaders were as unhappy with the attack as they were. Without question, however, they were pleased with the negative results of the first phase of the conflict for Iraq.

Iraq's Arab friends had been consulted by Saddam Hussein before the attack and apparently had given it their stamp of approval.¹⁰ Since they expected, as did Iraq, a quick and favorable outcome, the reasons for their approval are easy to infer. Increasingly alarmed at the revolutionary potential of Khomeini's appeal in the Arab world, they looked with satisfaction at the prospect of the collapse of the Khomeini phenomenon. Presumably there would be more ambivalence in their attitudes toward the growth in stature of President Hussein if the attack achieved its optimal

results. King Hussein of Jordan, the leader most fearful of Syria, was far and away Iraq's most enthusiastic ally.

SOVIET AND AMERICAN RESPONSES

From the beginning of the conflict, the Soviet and American response was surprisingly cautious and reserved. There appears to have been little tendency in either Washington or Moscow to see a particular advantage for the other implicit in the conflict. The United States government was finally making real progress toward extricating itself and its diplomats from the nightmare of the hostage crisis. Thus, the appearance of a conflict in the Persian Gulf, which could easily achieve a dynamics of its own and drag the great powers into unwanted confrontation, was doubly unwelcome. The Soviet government for its part did not conceal its view that its sometime Iraqi friend had moved in this case without sufficient provocation and hence, however gently the case was phrased, was the aggressor.¹¹ Soviet analyses of the conflict paralleled very closely those of Syria, Libya, Algeria and the PLO. The only victors in the conflict, it was argued, would be Israel and the Arab servants of American policy.

When it was obvious to everyone, following the first phase of the conflict, that Iraq could not administer a crushing defeat to Iran and, in fact, must eventually surrender the occupied Iranian territory, movement began from several quarters for a settlement of a conflict that only Israel could see as serving its interests. Efforts from Islamic nations, from the nonaligned community, from militant and pro-Soviet third world states, from the conservative Arabian peninsula states and from Iran's friend, Algeria, all focused on the same rather obvious formula. Iraq, despite its demand for the liberation of Arabistan, had always insisted simultaneously that it had no claims on Iranian territory other than to restore Arab control of areas seized by the Shah; Iraq would thus agree to a step-by-step withdrawal from Iran. The formal setting of the Iran-Iraq boundary would be deferred but presumably would become once again the *thalweg*. Iranian reparation demands also would be deferred until a later conference. The formula hence would essentially restore the status quo ante and most probably would lead eventually to a generous reparation payment to Iran.

But Khomeini would have none of this. As he pointed out in countless statements,¹² Iran had successfully halted an assault by an oppressor power conspiracy that was truly massive in proportion. Furthermore, Iran did this with a military force that objective analysts saw as entirely inferior to the forces of the conspiracy. Clearly, Iran's victory was the consequence of divine assistance. God would not have chosen Khomeini for His instrument in executing His divine plans were Khomeini given to accepting premature

⁸See Khomeini's speech to the nation February 11, 1983. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, South Asia, February 15, 1983, p. 11.

⁹The conspiracy thesis is fully developed in a speech by Hojatolislam Hashemi-Rafsanjani on February 25, 1983. *FBIS*, South Asia, February 25, 1983, pp. 11-4.

¹⁰Claudia Wright, "Implications of the Iraq-Iran War," *Foreign Affairs*, winter, 1980-1981, pp. 275-303.

¹¹*FBIS*, Soviet Union, January 21, 1981, pp. H1-4. This commentary is typical for the early period. It implies some United States role in instigating the attack but avoids any outright charge of aggression against Iraq.

¹²For a definitive statement on the Iranian attitude, see the interview with Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Musavi, *FBIS*, South Asia, March 15, 1983, p. 14.

compromises with a badly wounded, vulnerable and yet satanic, foe. Just as he had resisted all efforts to reach a compromise solution with the Shah, Khomeini flatly rejected this formula as well.

In 1982, the Khomeini regime gave evidence once again that it could count on the intense support of its followers—surely a minority but still a large component of the Iranian population. Mounting a succession of attacks on Iraqi forces occupying sections of western Iran, the Iranians achieved victories so impressive that external analysts began writing epitaphs for Hussein and speculating about the implications for the Arabian peninsula of a pro-Khomeini government in Iraq.¹³ When Khurramshahr was reoccupied, the Iranian military momentum appeared unstoppable. But basic positions did not change. Syrian–Iraqi enmity continued to give definition to inter-Arab relations; Jordan and Saudi Arabia continued to help Iraq, the United States and the Soviet Union continued to see the conflict as dangerous but in its essence well removed from the Soviet–American conflict. In fact, the only anomaly that developed was in French policy. For whatever reason, the government of President François Mitterrand appeared to see friendship with Iraq and enmity toward Iran as serving French national interests. Khomeini, of course, was not surprised.

The third phase of the Iraq–Iran war has been far less successful for the Iranians. Attempting to eliminate all remaining enclaves of Iraqi troops and taking the war into Iraq, the Iranians have launched a succession of major assaults from the south near Basra to the north in Kurdistan. In every case, the Iraqis have been able to bring to bear superior weaponry to halt the attacks and to administer terrible losses in terms of young Iranian lives. But the Iraqis have not launched serious counterattacks, presumably seeing no real possibility of inflicting a decisive defeat on Iran. The result is a war of attrition in which the human and material resources of both states are being consumed. But, clearly, Iraq is at a disadvantage. Unable to move its oil through the Gulf or through a pipeline in hostile Syria, the Iraqi regime is becoming increasingly dependent on financial assistance from Arab allies. And, because of the state of the oil market, that assistance has been reduced. As a result, the Iraqi population is increasingly feeling the effects of the war.

Saddam Hussein's control of his country has been far more secure than many Iranians believed it would be. But it rests on the same foundations as that of the Shah of Iran. The regime can take credit for improved living standards for Iraqis and particularly for the middle class—just as the Shah could in Iran. But regime survival requires in Iraq, as it did in Iran, the belief in its invulnerability and hence its prospects for longevity. Hussein evinces none of the Hamlet-like qualities of the Shah that were so important in allowing

the revolutionary momentum to develop when the crisis appeared. On the contrary, coercive control in Iraq is efficient and brutal. Positive popularity that would grant him legitimacy is probably no longer possible for Hussein, given the collapse of his plan to seize the leadership of the Arab nation. But, in addition, he is confronted in 1984 with a population increasingly restive because of economic difficulties and the loss of life on the front. He thus must be aware that members of his security forces (whom he needs for coercive control) might plan a coup leading to the formation of a government that could make peace with Iran.

The Iranian regime in contrast appears to be stabilizing its control. The President and Prime Minister of Iran have institutionalized their authority to the point that in all probability they could count on short-term survival were the charismatic leader to die. Iran's economy is beginning to improve and the oil revenue is sufficient both for purposes of conducting the war and stimulating the domestic economy. A consolidation of coercive control is also developing. That Iraq should look with some desperation for instruments of destruction that could deal severe damage to the Iranian economy is, given this picture, fully understandable. That Iran would threaten to respond to any such attack by striking at the economic jugular of the oppressor powers, the Strait of Hormuz, is equally understandable, given Khomeini's world view.

IN PERSPECTIVE

It remains to summarize and place in perspective this most bewildering of contemporary conflicts. To begin with, the Arab–Iranian context involves three major government and societal tendencies. There are first of all regimes described as conservative (although they are often characterized by high rates of economic growth) that essentially accept the political status quo in the area. Arab regimes in this category are content to operate within state boundaries, many of which were the products of imperial power decisions. They fear revolutionary tendencies from secular nationalists and Marxists and also from radical religious literalists. They have essentially acquiesced in Israel's permanence in the area as a Jewish state. And they tend to favor an informal alliance with the United States.

A second major tendency is nationalism, secular and usually leftist, though rarely doctrinairely Marxist. Regimes in this pattern tend to see Israel as the creation and regional instrument of Western imperialism. They seek to produce societal, economic and government change, which they describe as revolutionary but

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¹³*The New York Times*, May 26, 1982, p. 1:2.

The economic and political changes occurring in Israel mean that "sometime within the next two years a fateful choice of direction will be made. The very fluidity and delicacy of the current balance make any effort to predict that choice foolhardy."

Israel: A Time of Retrenchment

BY ALAN DOWTY

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By late 1983, Israel had reached the point of retrenchment and reassessment on a number of fronts. Its presence in Lebanon had been reduced to conform more or less to Israel's initial aims, abandoning broader goals of reshaping the Lebanese polity or forcing the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) forces. Economic realities forced the introduction of long-postponed austerity measures to restore some balance to an overburdened economy. And, finally, the resignation of Prime Minister Menachem Begin marked the passage of the last major leader from Israel's founding era. The resulting vacuum at the top seemed certain to produce a less clear sense of direction and more chaotic politics than prevailed during Begin's controversial but decisive turn at the helm.

In foreign affairs, the aftermath of the 1982 Lebanese campaign dominated Israel's activities in 1983. In February, 1983, the Kahan Commission—appointed by the government under pressure to investigate Israeli responsibility in the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in September, 1982—issued a detailed report that recommended the ouster of several officials who had failed to foresee the likelihood of such a massacre or to act more quickly to halt it. Foremost among these was Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, who was subsequently forced from his post but remained in the Cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio. The report also criticized Begin and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, without asking for their removal from office.

The government, in the meantime, was trying to consolidate its gains in Lebanon in order to meet domestic opposition to the war, which had peaked over the Sabra and Shatila incident but had continued afterward. Attention focused on the efforts to achieve a withdrawal agreement with the Lebanese government that would not only secure Israel's northern frontier and keep the PLO out of southern Lebanon, but that would also include some measure of "normalization" between the two countries—a peace treaty being, realistically, too much for the Lebanese to dare. This effort happily coincided with the focus of United States diplomacy, which was operating under the premise

(mistaken, as it turned out) that an Israeli-Lebanese agreement was the key to achieving Syrian and PLO withdrawal and establishing a unified and stable Lebanese government.

With the active mediation of United States Secretary of State George Shultz, Israeli and Lebanese representatives concluded an agreement in May that committed Israel to withdrawal from southern Lebanon in return for specific continuing security arrangements in the area, including some normalization measures that fell short of normal peaceful relations. But even this was dependent on Syrian agreement on a simultaneous withdrawal, and thus remained moribund when the Syrian government denounced the Lebanese concessions to Israeli security concerns in southern Lebanon. The only immediate benefit to Israel was that conclusion of the agreement relieved American pressures that had accompanied the hard bargaining process; arms shipments that had been "delayed" were released, and there was a general improvement in United States-Israeli relations as Washington refocused on the knotty problem of moving the seemingly unmovable Syrian government.

In the meantime, Israeli forces in Lebanon were subjected to continuing casualties in their exposed posture; in addition, they were drawn into the thankless task of separating Christian and Druse forces in the central Shuf area. Moreover, Israel's broader political goals—a stable Lebanese regime based on friendly Christian forces, the expulsion of all Syrian and PLO forces from Lebanon—seemed to be receding from its grasp; in any event, they were not brought closer by the military entanglements in which the country found itself. When he replaced Sharon, Defense Minister Moshe Arens moved immediately to rationalize the country's posture and aims in Lebanon, principally by withdrawing to a more defensible line and focusing on the security problems of southern Lebanon rather than the intractable political problems of Lebanon as a whole.

Subsequently, in September the Israeli army "re-deployed" south of the Awali River, vacating both the Shuf and the environs of Beirut and overriding the hesitations of American and Lebanese officials who

feared the resulting chaos and the loss of leverage against Syria. But apart from the opposition of Sharon and his followers, there was surprisingly little controversy in Israel. By this time, there was widespread disillusionment both within and outside the government over the wider involvement in Lebanon, where Israel's presence had made so little impact on deep communal splits and centuries-old Lebanese political patterns. It was increasingly clear that the Christians alone—either through the Phalange or the Amin Gemayel government—could not dominate Lebanon or achieve some degree of stability except by keeping their distance from Israel. No Lebanese government, moreover, could afford to put itself in total opposition to Damascus. Finally, the military defeats of the PLO would not bring about that organization's demise, nor end its intimidation of potential moderate Arab leaders on the West Bank, nor solve the problem of terrorism.

Disillusionment in Lebanon marked the end of a line of policy that had reflected, ironically, Israel's improved circumstances. Throughout most of its short history, Israel's major moves in foreign and defense policy had been dictated by the dire straits in which the country found itself; there was little margin for error, and little room for maneuver, under the existing external and internal pressures. But the reduction of the Soviet role in the area and the Egyptian peace treaty relieved some of these pressures and broadened the government's area of choice. Israeli interventions in Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, in an effort to prevent the PLO from developing a base of operations there, showed that Israel was able and willing to act at an earlier stage than had been the case in similar situations in earlier years.

The 1982 attack, moreover, included a decision to pursue PLO forces to Beirut and beyond. This policy choice, wise or unwise, would have been a luxury rather than a necessity in an earlier period. It was, in a sense, Israel's first "optional" war: a war that policymakers could have chosen to fight at a different time, or in a different way, or possibly not at all. As a result, from the outset it aroused internal opposition in a way that earlier campaigns had not. Much of this opposition was directed to the extent of the campaign and the manner in which policy was made, however, rather than to the basic aim of pacifying Israel's northern border (an aim regarded by most Israelis as necessary). The retrenchment could be seen, therefore, as a return to the original aims of the Lebanese campaign rather than a total repudiation of the government; it was the "optional" dimensions of the intervention that were being abandoned.

¹Several different polls are reported in the *The Jerusalem Post International Edition*, January 30–February 5, 1983, and June 19–25, 1983.

²Shlomo Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 226–227.

Nevertheless, the Begin government's partial retreat, after suffering heavy casualties in the pursuit of unattained goals, was bound to strengthen domestic criticism. Even the single major achievement—the Israeli-Lebanese agreement—seemed to be in jeopardy as the Gemayel government came under increasing pressure to repudiate it, and leaders of Israel's opposition Labor party were urging complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

The frustrations in Lebanon combined with other factors to produce a wave of discontent with the Begin government. Public approval ratings in one poll dropped from 66 percent in August, 1982, to 44 percent in January, 1983, and by midyear Begin's Likud coalition and the opposition Labor party were running neck and neck in the preference polls (the Likud had still been far ahead at the beginning of the year).¹ Begin also suffered a loss of prestige when his candidate for Israel's presidency (the ceremonial head of state chosen by the Knesset) was defeated by the Labor candidate, Chaim Herzog.

Much of the discontent could be traced to economic woes. Before the 1981 elections, Finance Minister Yoram Aridor had instituted a series of tax cuts, mainly on consumption items, that improved the Likud's popularity but aggravated the country's basic economic problems, in particular the negative trade balance. The balance of payments deficit steadily worsened, and by early 1983 Israel had only three months of cash reserves. Foreign aid was being used almost entirely to pay debts; debt service had grown to 32 percent of export earnings. Inflation, which had earlier been somewhat reduced, was back to its previous high of more than 140 percent a year. Labor productivity was not keeping up with the wage increases made necessary by the inflation.

The accumulated strains of office, aggravated by the Lebanese imbroglio, economic crisis, and Begin's personal problems (his continuing depression after his wife's death in 1982 and his generally poor state of health) brought Begin to offer his resignation in August, resisting the pleas of his startled colleagues. Saying simply that "I cannot go on," Begin left a void at the center of Israeli political life and ended an era that had been critical in recasting the shape of Israeli politics and society.

The significance of the Begin era can be understood only by contrasting it with the long domination (half a century) of Labor Zionism in the Jewish community of Palestine and Israel. Labor Zionists had added a social dimension to the aim of Jewish statehood. They pursued not only socialist ideals, but also a restructuring of Jewish life—self-reliance, a return to the soil, secularization—that was in some ways a "revolution against Jewish history."² Not surprisingly, they found themselves in considerable conflict with traditional Jewish institutions, leaders, and patterns of life.

Labor Zionists predominated in the pre-World War I immigration to Palestine and set the basic outlook of the Jewish community there. But after 1920 most of the Jews who settled in Palestine did so more as a matter of necessity than of choice. In fact, about two million refugees have reached Israel over the years, and with their descendants they form the vast majority of the country's population.

The puzzle, then, was not the eventual decline of Labor Zionism, but rather its long hold on power. Most of the population held no strong prior commitment to socialism, the dignity of manual labor, a return to the soil, changing traditional occupational structures, secularizing Jewish life or other features of Labor Zionism.

The rise of the Likud and Begin was in part, therefore, a reassertion of traditional Jewish occupational and social patterns, religious beliefs and non-European influences. Like other new societies, Israel moved gradually from ideology to patterns more reflective of its human and material realities. In early Zionism, politics may have created society, but the more usual process became dominant: social realities were shaping politics.

For the first two decades of statehood, from 1949 to 1969, the Labor parties as a bloc never drew less than 49 percent of the vote in the seven elections held. This remarkable stability, in the face of massive political, social and demographic change, has usually been explained as the result of the tendency to stick to existing leadership in conditions of stress, the prestige of Labor leaders as the founding fathers of the country, and the political elites' control of the benefits for newcomers. But the 1967 war catalyzed the trends that had been quietly gaining momentum for some time: a decline in classic Labor ideology, the replacement of the "movement style of life" with television-age mass politics, a growth of religious assertiveness, and the politicization of non-European immigrants and their children.

With the ideological loosening, there was a growing polarization of Israeli politics, as parties that had once found cooperation impossible joined in electoral blocs. In 1961, the two largest parties together won 59 of the 120 seats in the Knesset; by 1981, the two largest blocs (the Labor-Mapam Alignment and the Likud bloc) together won 95 seats. The polarization was also accompanied by a shift to the Right, as Likud seats increased from 26 in 1969 to 43 in 1977.

Contributing to this result was the Likud success in attracting the votes of the Sephardim, those of non-European background who are largely immigrants from Muslim countries. Though comprising most of

the working class in Israel, the Sephardim were alienated from the socialist parties by the fact that the Left was the establishment, and they were attracted to Begin by his hawkish stand on Arab-Israeli issues, because most of them were refugees from Arab lands. They were also more responsive to the traditional historic and religious appeals of Begin's approach than to the cold rationalism of Western liberalism and socialism represented by Labor. In any event, in both the 1977 and 1981 elections, Sephardi voters favored the Likud by a two-to-one margin, while voters of European background (Ashkenazim) favored Labor in the same proportion.

But while social and political changes may have shattered the dominance of Labor, they did not bring about a new dominance by the Likud. In fact, the most basic observation about Israeli politics in the mid-1980's is the extreme fluidity of Israeli opinion and its responsiveness to events. Since 1970, for example, the percentage of Israelis answering "yes" to the question of whether Arab countries are ready to make real peace has varied between 10 percent and 80 percent. Similarly, the percentage of those willing to return some or all of the occupied territories in order to reach a peace agreement has varied between roughly 55 percent and 90 percent.³ Views on such fundamental issues as the return of occupied territories can shift as much as 10 percent from one month to the next (and even more rapidly, in response to events like Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem). Specific policies are still shaped, in other words, by events beyond Israel's control, and especially by events in the Arab world.

The convergence of all these factors means that the post-Begin political era will remain highly unpredictable in Israel. The fluidity of opinion, the large floating vote, the responsiveness to events, the polarization of the party system, and the decline of ideological predictability all indicate a highly competitive system in which a small swing on election day can determine the basic orientation of Israeli politics for the following four years (early polls in the 1981 election campaign gave the Likud only 2 seats; in the end Begin won 48).

A CHOICE OF DIRECTION

The delicacy of the Israeli political balance is especially critical in view of the basic choice of direction that will be made within the next two years. By 1985—sooner if the government of Yitzhak Shamir fails to maintain its tenuous unity—the Likud must approach the electorate without the commanding presence of Menachem Begin to secure a renewed mandate for its often controversial policies on basic Arab-Israeli issues.

Though the balance may be narrow, the difference between the two major blocs on these issues is substantial. The classic Labor position, since the days of

³Data from the Continuing Survey of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, as reported in Russell A. Stone, *Social Change in Israel: Attitudes and Events, 1967-1979* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 18-33, 40-45.

the Mandate, has been to favor a relatively compact but homogeneously Jewish homeland, rather than broader territorial claims that involve the integration of a large non-Jewish population. Thus Labor leaders, from David Ben-Gurion on, were willing on practical grounds to accept the principle of partition, of dividing historic Palestine into Arab and Jewish states.

Consequently, the Labor position on the territories occupied in 1967 was, by and large, a practical position. There would be some changes in the 1949 armistice lines: Jerusalem would be reunited under Israeli sovereignty, and there would be minor border changes on the West Bank. The Straits of Tiran and the Golan Heights would remain under Israeli control. But the bulk of the West Bank, including nearly all the Arab population, would be returned to Arab rule (presumably to Jordan) in return for peace. Thus, the Labor government initiated Jewish settlements only on the Golan Heights and in unpopulated areas of the West Bank considered important to security.

The Likud position, derived from the revisionist Zionism of Vladimir Jabotinsky, is basically different. Revisionists have always opposed any partition of Palestine, on both sides of the Jordan River, and have stressed the Jewish claim to its entirety on historic, legal and practical grounds. While Labor Zionists hoped that common class interests would enable Arabs and Jews to cooperate, and that a Jewish socialist commonwealth could be built without encroaching on Arab rights, revisionists put nation above class. They were ready to recognize the rights of Arabs as individuals, but they denied the existence of collective or national Arab rights in Palestine.

Begin was therefore consistently opposed to "the return of Judea and Samaria to alien rule," and acted to accelerate Jewish settlement throughout the area, including the populated area. Israel under Begin was committed to remaining on the West Bank, and to defending the right of Jews to live anywhere in the historic homeland. At Camp David, Begin agreed to autonomy for West Bank Arabs during a five-year transition period, but with certain important stated and unstated reservations. First, Israel still reserved the right to claim Israeli sovereignty in the negotiations at the end of the transition period. Second, Begin made it clear that the autonomy envisioned was personal, applying to the Arab population but not to the West Bank as a territory (this accorded perfectly with traditional revisionist thinking). Finally, after a temporary pause, settlement of the West Bank would continue.

In trying to carry out their respective policies, the Likud enjoyed an advantage over Labor. The realization of the Labor program required the cooperation of a negotiating partner; by itself, the Labor government could only try to keep the "territory for peace" option open. Thus 10 years could pass with no progress and with skepticism growing over the Labor ap-

proach. On the other hand, the establishment of new settlements could be accomplished unilaterally and was, moreover, a cumulative process. As time passed, the Likud program was bound to come closer to realization as the West Bank became more closely linked with Israel.

In recent years, the pace of settlement has picked up as the Begin government adopted a new strategy. In place of small-scale settlements in the heart of the West Bank, which lacked an economic base and attracted only the most hardy, the government began to build attractive housing developments within commuting distance of major Israeli cities. In place of a few thousand settlers, there was talk of 100,000 by 1985 and of double that number before the end of the decade. Clearly, at some point this process would become irreversible.

But, again, in the absence of a negotiating partner, those who opposed this approach lacked a credible alternative. The lack of Arab interest in the stalemated autonomy talks was perhaps not too surprising, considering the way in which the Begin government interpreted the concept of autonomy to accommodate continued Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. But despite the best American efforts, there was no movement by Jordan, West Bank Arabs, or other Palestinian representatives to join a negotiating framework based on the principle of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank (or at least the Arab-populated areas of it). The continued absence of such a partner could prove fateful, as time is clearly running out on a peace based on territorial compromise.

SHAMIR'S PROSPECTS

Begin's resignation was unlikely to have an immediate impact on Israeli policy; his successor, Yitzhak Shamir, was no less dedicated to the revisionist approach and put together a Cabinet almost identical to Begin's. But it was clear from the outset that Shamir's success in pursuing these goals would depend in large part on factors unrelated to the issues. Without Begin's public stature, electioneering magic, and political shrewdness, the question was whether Shamir could hold together a coalition based on a very narrow majority, in an increasingly fragmented political scene marked by disillusionment with the Lebanese involvement and a growing economic crisis.

Shamir had already been challenged within the Likud by Deputy Prime Minister David Levy, a representative of the next generation and of the Sephardi

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"The fact that the PLO has survived the events of the past 18 months, kept its institutions intact, and retained the support of a majority of its constituents is a testament to the durability of the Palestinian national movement. However, this cannot soften the harsh realities now confronting the PLO, particularly Arafat and Fatah."

Palestinians in the 1980's

BY AARON DAVID MILLER

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SHORTLY after the opening of the first Palestine National Congress in May, 1964, Ahmad Shukairy, chairman of the newly created Palestine Liberation Organization, predicted that the PLO's power would be based on "faith in the inevitability of the liberation of Palestine and the determination of Palestinians to mobilize all their . . . energies toward this end."¹ Almost 20 years later, Shukairy's hopes remain unfulfilled. The PLO, the institutional embodiment of Palestinian nationalism, is still reeling from the impact of the Israeli invasion, bitterly divided and dangerously dependent on Syria. Deprived of a military option and unable to formulate an effective political strategy, the PLO remains paralyzed—more vulnerable than ever to the challenges that have confronted it over the years.*

The PLO is now confronting its most severe crisis in its 19-year history. The loss of West Beirut and southern Lebanon, the rebellion within Fatah (the largest faction in the PLO), and deteriorating relations with Syria have posed enormous problems that could radically change the nature of the organization and the environment in which it operates. For Yasir Arafat, the crisis poses a direct threat to his authority and independence. Indeed, unless he can find a way to improve the management of the divisions within Palestinian ranks and reduce his dependency on the Syrians, the 1980's will bring the Palestinians no closer to their goals. In the end, the PLO may emerge as a far less cohesive, independent and relevant factor in any negotiated solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The PLO's current crisis can be evaluated only in the context of its past successes and failures. Its accomplishments are clear. In two decades, the PLO has developed from a marginal Arab-dominated group to an organization recognized by most Palestinians, the Arab states, and much of the international community as the Palestinian people's preeminent representative. It has taken dispirited, dispersed refugee communities

and tried to forge a new source of national pride and identity. Moreover, supported by the Arab states, the PLO has succeeded in pushing the Palestinian problem to center stage and identifying itself with a solution.

Nonetheless, the PLO's diplomatic gains in the international arena and its success as a symbol for Palestinians have not given it the resources it needs to compete in a volatile and dangerous Middle East. The money, massive infusion of arms, media attention, and impressive diplomatic gains of the past decade may have even lulled much of the Palestinian leadership into a false sense of security and overconfidence that masks the PLO's vulnerability.

The PLO's current problems and the dichotomy between its successes abroad and its weaknesses at home result largely from its unique structure and highly dependent position in a volatile Middle East. Given the constraints under which it operates, the Palestinian resistance movement is remarkably independent. But it is still more a prisoner of events over which it has little control than an autonomous and self-sufficient actor. Divided within its own ranks, without a secure base of operations or independent source of financial and military support, and separated from the territory it seeks to liberate, the PLO leadership, specifically Arafat and the Fatah faction, are engaged in a continuous balancing act, juggling and accommodating the interests of the other constituent groups and the demands of their Arab patrons.

Thus what emerges is an organization seriously constrained by its own structure and environment. These constraints fall into three broad categories—organizational, inter-Arab and Israeli. Factionalism and competing centers of authority have hampered the Palestinian national movement at every stage of its development. Although considerable gains in centralizing decision making and authority have been made, the PLO remains an organization in which power resides not in an overarching framework but in the various sub-groups under the PLO umbrella.

Although by the mid 1970's Arafat's Fatah organization had emerged as the closest thing to a center of power, it faced enormous obstacles in its efforts to

*The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State or any other government agency.

¹*The New York Times*, May 31, 1964, p. 6.

shape PLO tactics and strategy. First, Fatah was itself highly decentralized and divided over how best to pursue Palestinian goals. Second, the presence of smaller PLO groups (some with powerful Arab patrons), prevented any single group from dominating the entire movement. Finally, the need to preserve the appearance of unity and democratic organization and avoid fragmentation gave smaller groups an influence far out of proportion to their size. The consensual quality of PLO decision making, as reflected in institutions like the Palestine National Council (PNC) and the Executive Committee (EC), prevented Fatah from arbitrarily imposing its will on the others. Even so, elements within Fatah and other PLO groups have long criticized Arafat's tendency to make decisions without proper consultation. Indeed, the view that Arafat has an "authoritarian" leadership style is widely shared by the current Fatah rebels.

Organizational constraints are exacerbated by the PLO's dependence on Arab regimes. Arab states, whose commitment to the Palestinian cause has moral, ideological and practical dimensions, fill PLO coffers, facilitate the transfer of its military equipment, plead its case in world capitals and, in two cases, control groups under the PLO umbrella. In return, depending upon their interest and their ability to influence resistance politics, Arab regimes try to insure that Palestinian interests remain compatible if not subordinate to their own national concerns.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The PLO has developed its own unique leverage and assets within the Arab world and has used them remarkably well. Moreover, there is a community of interests between the PLO and its Arab supporters. This cannot change the fact, however, that Arab and Palestinian interests have frequently collided, sometimes violently. In September, 1970 (Black September), Jordan's King Hussein moved against the *fedayeen* challenge to his authority. Five years later (Black June), the PLO was engaged in a head-on conflict with the Syrians. Ironically, with the exception of Syria, no Arab state was willing to risk a serious confrontation with Israel or the United States over the Israeli government's move to destroy the PLO in the summer of 1982, and even in this crisis the Syrians provided only limited support.

Organizational and Arab constraints have seriously weakened the PLO's ability to confront its ultimate challenge: Israel. Lacking reliable great power support, the PLO has proved no match for a militarily and technologically superior state determined to prevent it from achieving any of its goals. Armed struggle, so vital to building morale in Palestinian ranks, credibility in the Arab world and visibility abroad, has failed to sap Israel's strength or embroil the Arab states in a successful war, let alone liberate any part of Palestine.

Indeed, the PLO's most effective conventional military weapon—its ability to shell and rocket northern Israel—triggered a massive Israeli attack into Lebanon.

Although the PLO has scored impressive diplomatic gains abroad, Palestinians have not been able to translate these into political leverage and power. The PLO has not succeeded in winning the support of the United States—the only power capable of persuading Israel to withdraw from the West Bank—nor the weakening of the United States-Israeli connection. The PLO has widespread political support in the West Bank and Gaza and has effectively orchestrated opposition to the Camp David accords. But it has failed to mount a serious campaign to oppose Israeli settlement policies in the occupied territories. Indeed, in a decade and a half of Israeli occupation, Palestinians inside and outside the territories have failed to make the costs of that occupation too high for Israel to bear.

BLACK JUNE REVISITED?

Israel's June, 1982, invasion of Lebanon seriously weakened the PLO's ability to cope with all the challenges discussed above. Paradoxically, the war initially created new diplomatic opportunities for the Palestinian movement. The PLO survived the Israeli siege of Beirut, won widespread sympathy and increased recognition abroad and indirectly triggered the evolution of an American peace plan more sympathetic to Palestinian goals than any that had preceded it. Indeed, the six-month period beginning with the September massacres at the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps and ending with the collapse of the Hussein-Arafat negotiations in April, 1983, opened new but risky opportunities for Palestinians. But these were not seized, and Arafat and Fatah were left to cope with the harsh realities created by the Israeli invasion.

The war and its consequences created two new realities that may profoundly affect the nature of the PLO and the environment in which it operates. First, the war has drastically narrowed the PLO's freedom to maneuver in Lebanon. Although Lebanon could hardly be described as a safe haven for the Palestinians, it gave the movement a base from which to organize politically and to launch operations against Israel. West Beirut allowed the PLO an opportunity to create a complex infrastructure that coordinated diplomatic efforts abroad and reinforced ties with the Palestinians throughout the diaspora. The concentration of resources also gave Arafat and Fatah considerable leverage with other Palestinian groups, through preeminence in the PLO's military, political, and financial institutions. Moreover, southern Lebanon allowed the PLO to remain involved and relevant to the Arab-Israeli conflict—a *sine qua non* for an organization that requires armed struggle to maintain legitimacy and cohesion within its own ranks.

Second, as a consequence of its loss of maneuvering room in Lebanon, the Palestinian movement has become dangerously dependent on Syria. Since 1980, the Syrians have markedly increased their leverage over Arafat. But the military defeat by the Israelis and the breakdown of the Arafat-Hussein negotiations have made the PLO even more vulnerable to Syrian influence. Gradually, Damascus has narrowed Fatah's freedom of operations in the Bekaa Valley and has confined Arafat to northern Lebanon. Moreover, the Syrians have actively supported the rebellion within Fatah ranks that reduces Arafat's authority and independence. The personal animosity between Arafat and Syrian President Hafez Assad has further complicated the prospects of a meaningful reconciliation. Indeed, unless Arafat finds a way to overcome these internal and external challenges, his own authority and ability to maneuver will be permanently compromised.

THE END OF THE ARAFAT ERA?

In the first few months after the PLO withdrawal from Beirut, it appeared that Arafat might escape any serious challenge to his authority. The PLO had withstood a three-month Israeli siege of Beirut, picked up invaluable political support abroad and maintained a rare degree of internal cohesion. The Palestinian issue was on center-stage as Arafat continued his shuttling throughout the Arab world and Europe in an effort to exploit the post-Lebanon environment. In February, 1983, at the PNC meeting in Algiers, Arafat was reelected Executive Committee chairman and seemed to be placating PLO hard-liners, maintaining PLO unity, and leaving the door open for his diplomatic initiatives.

While Arafat globe-trotted and maneuvered, however, Palestinian fighters and political leaders grew embittered at his heavy-handed style, suspicious of his moderate gestures and resentful of his failure to examine critically the events leading to the PLO's military defeat.

There were signs of discontent with Arafat long before the May rebellion within Fatah ranks. The rift between the Fatah left and center appeared to be widening, and Arafat seemed to be losing touch with the concerns of Palestinian fighters in the field. Most notable, however, was the rejection by the Fatah Central

Committee in April of Arafat's proposed agreement with King Hussein, a tacit admission that the PLO chairman had pushed too quickly and without sufficient authority on the diplomatic front.²

Although the mutiny within Fatah ranks was ostensibly triggered by Arafat's appointment of unpopular garrison commanders in eastern Lebanon, it reflected deeper organizational and ideological splits within Fatah that had been developing for years. The defeat in Lebanon and the increasing volatility of the "who lost Lebanon debate" in PLO ranks provided a catalyst for civilian politicians and military leaders who had long resented both the style and substance of Arafat's approach to furthering Palestinian national goals. Some, like Nimr Saleh, whose membership in Fatah's central committee has recently been frozen, were at odds with Arafat for years over what they believed to be his accommodationist and pro-Jordanian tendencies.³ Others, like Fatah commander Said Musa Muragha (Abu Musa), were appalled by Arafat's promotion of military officers accused of cowardice and corruption and embittered by his willingness to subordinate the armed struggle to diplomatic action. Although the Fatah leftists, encouraged by Syria, exploited the fighters' discontent, they saw the need for reforms in the PLO's leadership and policies. Indeed, the rebels' campaign for reforms, as Abu Musa himself has stated, focused on the need for a collective leadership and an emphasis on armed struggle rather than on political action.⁴

At the time of this writing, the rebellion within the Fatah was in its sixth month with little sign of abating. The Syrians, who may have had a role in orchestrating the initial uprising, have consistently exploited it.⁵ Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that rebel pressure against Fatah units in the Bekaa would have been possible without Syrian acquiescence and support. The Syrians have the resources to take most of the military steam out of the rebellion and facilitate a compromise between loyalists and dissidents.

But Arafat has survived internal challenges before, and he probably calculates that he can outlast and outmaneuver his Palestinian opponents. He has tried to paint the Fatah dissidents as Syrian clients.⁶ The longer the rebellion continues, the more likely the dissidents will come under Syrian sway—a factor Arafat will use to discredit them. Moreover, Fatah's control over PLO institutions, particularly finances, will give Arafat powerful leverage to deal with the rebels.

Arafat may well succeed in isolating the rebels and maintaining his role as Fatah leader and PLO chief. In the past, particularly in 1972 and 1978, Arafat contained periodic revolts from Palestinian commanders. Now, however, with his base of operations drastically curtailed, his political strategy in disarray, and his deteriorating relations with Damascus, he is less able to coopt and contain such challenges. Moreover, the PLO rebels, many of whom are dedicated fighters untainted

²Interview with Abu Iyad, KUNA (Kuwait News Agency), April 11, 1983; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, Middle East and Africa, April 12, 1983, p. A2.

³Interview with Nimr Saleh, January 21, 1983; *FBIS*, Middle East and Africa, January 25, 1983, p. A8.

⁴Interview with Abu Musa, *Manchester Guardian*, July 4, 1983, p. 13.

⁵Eric Rouleau, "The Future of the PLO," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 1 (fall, 1983), pp. 138-156.

⁶Interview with Yasir Arafat, Baghdad, Voice of the PLO, July 23, 1983; *FBIS*, Middle East and Africa, July 25, 1983, p. A5.

by corruption and political maneuvering, have considerable support among Palestinians in Lebanon. Indeed, unless Arafat has decided to accept an irrevocable split within Fatah and ignore Syrian interests, he will have to pay a price for reconciliation.

First, the dissidents, supported by the Syrians and tacitly by other PLO groups, will push for greater "democratization" within the PLO—a codeword for a more collective leadership. Here rebel interests will coincide with Syrian objectives. Rebel groups want to end Arafat's ability to pursue, even informally, diplomatic initiatives like the Fez or Reagan initiatives without formal PLO or Syrian approval.

Second, the PFLP and DFLP, who have supported Arafat and tactically cooperated to preserve PLO unity, will also want compensation and will probably demand a greater role in decision making. George Habash, head of the PFLP, has recently become more strident in his statements about the need for a collective leadership, closer alignment with Syria, and the importance of resisting any plan that compromises Palestinian goals.⁷ Both the PFLP and DFLP are aware of the dangers of reliance on Syria, but they are not prepared for an open break. Indeed, they will ride the Syrian tiger if necessary, in an effort to ensure that Arafat does not cut a deal with Hussein.

Arafat may hope to finesse the issue of organizational reforms and try to shuffle leadership positions to deflect rebel criticism. The 18-member mediation committee set up by the PLO's Central Committee, however, has complicated that strategy by submitting a report favorable to the dissidents.⁸ Unless he is prepared for an open break with Damascus, Arafat may be forced to make formal concessions or, at least temporarily, to accept informal curbs on his authority.

The PLO's current troubles also pose serious problems for Palestinian communities in the diaspora, particularly in Lebanon. The Israeli invasion and the current disarray in PLO ranks have left Lebanon's 400,000 to 500,000 Palestinians without effective leadership, protection or support. The extent of their vulnerability was reflected in the tragic and brutal massacre of civilians at Sabra and Shatila and the continued harassment of Palestinians in southern Lebanon. Even Palestinian refugees in the Bekaa Valley and Tripoli area who had largely escaped Israeli and Christian attacks have since been caught up in the violence of intra-Palestinian rivalries.

Although the removal of PLO guerrillas from southern Lebanon and West Beirut paradoxically ended the cycle of Israeli-Palestinian violence that claimed thousands of lives, Palestinian refugees are

more vulnerable than ever. Whatever the drawbacks of the PLO's presence, the guerrillas offered protection for civilians against a variety of adversaries. It seems unlikely that the Phalangist militia would have entered Sabra and Shatila if they believed the camps were defended by heavily armed PLO fighters.

Even with the presence of the multinational forces in the Beirut area, Palestinians have been subjected to the violence of armed groups and the arbitrary treatment of the Lebanese authorities. Although the Israelis have provided considerable protection, Palestinian civilians have been victimized by kidnapping, murder and extortion. Tensions between Shia and Palestinians probably account for some of the incidents; but more likely the refugees are victims of Christian militiamen.

Moreover, the Lebanese government, overwhelmed by its own problems and unwilling to integrate those Palestinians without Lebanese citizenship, is unable to protect their interests. Nor will Arab regimes agree to accept large numbers of refugees; witness the difficulties in finding homes for PLO fighters during the withdrawal from Beirut. The PLO itself provided a wide range of social, educational, medical services and employment opportunities for the refugees. Some of these services will be maintained by United Nations and other private relief agencies. But barring a fundamental improvement in their political status, the Palestinian community will remain dependent and vulnerable, resented by Christians and Muslims alike.

For the PLO's other important constituency—Palestinians on the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza—the current crisis poses serious risks and choices. For most politically aware West Bankers, a united PLO offered a symbol of Palestinian identity and a determination to resist Israeli policies. Although most Palestinians have sought to take advantage of the social and economic benefits of 17 years of Israeli occupation, they have refused to participate in Israeli or American-sponsored political initiatives to determine the final disposition of the West Bank and Gaza, looking instead toward the PLO for "national" leadership. The PLO has maintained their loyalties through a unique combination of intimidation and respect, benefiting from a leadership vacuum and the divisions in the occupied territories.

The present disarray within the Palestinian ranks and Syria's heavy-handed behavior have shocked West Bankers who hoped in the beginning that Arafat would easily contain this latest challenge. There is a

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⁷Interview with George Habash, *Al-Mustaqbal*, August 13, 1983; *FBIS*, Middle East and Africa, August 16, 1983, p. A2.

⁸See text of the report in *Sawt Ash-Shab*, August 26, 1983; *FBIS*, Middle East and Africa, August 30, 1983, p. A1.

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"If Jordan can succeed in forging a political majority of Palestinians from among the Palestinian citizens of the East Bank, the notable moderates of the West Bank, and Arafat's rump of Fatah—and retain ultimate control over the coalition—then Jordan may lead Palestinian interests into a negotiation with Israel that has at least a chance to succeed."

Jordanian Foreign Policy

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THE constraints on Jordanian policy are a consequence of three related conditions.* The first concerns the crucial relationship between the ruling Hashemite hierarchy and Jordan's largely Palestinian population, a relationship that influences most if not all of Jordan's policy choices. The second concerns Jordan's economic well-being, which depends overwhelmingly on external aid of various sorts and which has a direct bearing on Jordan's political health. The third concerns Jordan's internal and external security problems.

The Amir Abdallah found himself ruler of Transjordan in 1920, his country the product of British imperial policy amid the local confusion attending the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The population of Transjordan was less than 375,000 and less than 20 percent of the population lived in the four largest towns. Abdallah gradually won the fealty of first the urban and later the tribal bedouin population through a program of cooptation and conquest, aided by British money and arms. To do this, Abdallah cultivated the loyalty of his small but efficient British-trained and -led army. So skilled was this force—the Arab Legion—and so intimate was the relationship between Abdallah and the British, that the Legion was used from time to time outside the borders of Transjordan, for which the Amir was well rewarded.¹

In the days before World War II, Abdallah did not rule with the aid of a Jordanian or Transjordanian national consciousness. Rather, the bonds of loyalty

between ruler and ruled were far more traditional, based on personal oaths, religious identification (aided in this case by Abdallah's Sherifian status), and the web of kinship ties.²

In the meantime, these traditional bonds were breaking down on the other side of the river in Palestine, and a Palestinian political consciousness was gradually taking root in response to the more pervasive presence of the British, the more modern economy and cosmopolitan culture of the Mediterranean littoral, and the challenge posed by Zionism. Abdallah had his own political designs on Palestine in the interwar years and this set him against both the Zionists and the Palestinian national movement dominated by the Husayni clan.³

The Palestinians and their Arab allies failed to prevent the creation of Israel in 1948 and that part of the mandate allotted for a Palestinian Arab state was seized by Abdallah, who subsequently ruled with the aid of his local Palestinian allies. But this seizure brought with it dominion over 400,000 residents of what became known as the West Bank (of the Jordan River) plus another 475,000 refugees from what became Israel. Of this latter group of politically conscious Palestinians, roughly 120,000 ended up in the East Bank.

The integration and control of this population posed a challenge wholly unlike that which Abdallah faced in the early 1920's. Unlike the bedouin and townspeople of the East Bank then, the Palestinians were politicized, angry, unattached to the ideals of monarchy and unimpressed with Sherifian prestige. New circumstances also demanded a change in Abdallah's pragmatic attitude toward Zionism, but he did not appreciate this in time. After engaging too openly in negotiations with Israel, Abdallah was assassinated in 1951 by one of his Palestinian subjects.

The pan-Arabist dimension of the Palestine problem was thus driven home to the Hashemite elite of Transjordan by a dramatic shift in its own body politic. The monarchy, led after 1953 by Abdallah's grandson Hussein, still desired the integration of its new population into the Hashemite realm, but it could not afford to deviate appreciably from the Arab consensus

*I would like to thank Jean Taylor for reviewing a draft of this essay and offering a useful critique.

¹See here P. J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921–1957* (London: Frank Cass, 1959).

²Sherifian status refers to the Hashemites' claimed descent from the Prophet Mohammed. For a brief discussion of the traditional patterns of authority in the Arab world, see Adam M. Garfinkle, "Genesis," in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Crisis: Perspectives* (New York: Praeger, forthcoming 1984).

³For more detail, see Garfinkle, "Jordan and Arab Polarization," *Current History*, January, 1982, pp. 23–24, and the sources cited therein.

on Israel and Palestine lest it be undone by its own subjects or by its neighbors. Thus King Hussein encouraged the Palestinians to focus their political aspirations on the Palestine of their dreams and rhetorically identified with those aspirations. Jordan granted the Palestinians "temporary" Jordanian citizenship against the day when Palestine would be recovered from the Jews.⁴

At the same time, the monarchy strove to integrate the Palestinians into the country at all levels, using their wealth and talent to build up the relatively primitive East Bank at the expense of the West. But Jordan also maintained a de facto peace along the armistice line with Israel and transformed parts of the bedouin-led Arab Legion into a bedouin-led internal security force able to protect the monarchy against internal upheaval. The rise of "progressive" Arab nationalism, first in Egypt and later in Syria and Iraq, in combination with Jordan's volatile Palestinian population, made such a precaution a requisite for survival.

The "Jordanianization" of the Palestinians proceeded slowly but steadily throughout the 1950's and 1960's until the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war. Although Jordan was not a fully unified polity by any means, a "Jordanian" identity in the East Bank encompassed the bedouin and townsfolk east of the river and, increasingly, a segment of the 1948 Palestinian refugees who had made good lives for themselves and their families within the Hashemite realm. For this latter group, being a Jordanian was an act of political schizophrenia, because it was becoming difficult to pretend that Hashemite sovereignty was transitory.⁵

The 1967 war disturbed the balance that Jordan had created in two ways. First, the war thrust 200,000 non-Jordanianized Palestinians into the East Bank, some of them refugees for the first time, some refugees already "once-removed." The Jordanianization process had not proceeded nearly so far on the West Bank as on the East, as was evidenced by the increasing restlessness of the West Bank Palestinian population in 1966 and early 1967. Thus, in a sense, the monarchy was back to where it had started in 1948. Second, the war led to the reemergence of radical Palestinian nationalism in the newly constituted Palestine Liberation Organization. While the PLO's ultimate aspiration was to destroy Israel, its program and presence in Jordan threatened to undo the very foundation of Palestinian loyalty to the monarchy; it suggested that

"temporary" Jordanian sovereignty was a Hashemite deception disguising a design for permanent control.

The inevitable civil war between the PLO and the monarchy that followed in 1970 evidenced two fundamental truths. First, it showed that the de facto abdication of Jordan from the battle against Israel would carry a potentially high domestic price in perpetuity. Second, the fact that most Palestinians on the East Bank did not support the PLO but either remained neutral or helped the government showed that the Jordanianization program was to a considerable degree irreversible. Together, this meant that pursuing a formal peace with Israel was out of the question for domestic reasons alone; pursuing a war was dangerous for other reasons. But disengagement from the Palestinian issue altogether was also impossible if Jordan hoped to enjoy safe relations with its neighbors.

Since the civil war, Jordan has sought refuge diplomatically in an elusive Arab consensus while proceeding pragmatically with the Jordanianization of the 1967 wave of refugees. In subtle ways, too, Jordan has sought to weaken the PLO both in the Arab world and in the West Bank with mixed success.⁶ There are still three "nations" in Jordan: old East Bankers of bedouin stock; un-Jordanianized Palestinians who have come across the river since 1967; and Jordanianized Palestinians. But the ratio of the second "nation" to the third is continually dropping despite a steady flow of West Bank Palestinians to Jordan from Israeli occupation. This process is aided greatly by the passage of time. A new generation of Jordanian Palestinians, a group removed spatially and generationally from Palestine, is now growing up in Jordan.

What worries King Hussein most, perhaps, is that a bold Israeli attempt to expel large numbers of West Bank Palestinians into Jordan could decisively upset the Jordanianization process. Thus, Jordan's interest in resisting Israeli settlement of the West Bank has to do not only with the Arab character of the area, but also with the effect on the long-term East Bank stability of the West Bank's progressive Arab depopulation. The other worry is Jordan's continuing prosperity.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Jordan is more prosperous today than it has ever been, and economic vitality is crucial to the regime's political aims. Even Palestinians who have come to Jordan relatively recently and who may not like the King or the monarchy are aware of the personal costs of risking a better future for a rarified political ideal.

But the King and his ministers understand how fragile this prosperity is. Jordan's wealth depends to a great degree on external subsidies, mainly from the Arab states. In 1982, Jordan's gross national product totaled about \$4.5 billion. Government revenue from all internal sources (direct and indirect taxes, fees and so forth) for that year came to about \$1.1 billion. Government expenditures totaled about \$1.9 billion.

⁴Good discussions of the Palestinians in Jordan between 1948 and 1967 can be found in Avi Plascov, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948-1957* (London: Frank Cass, 1981); Shaul Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), and Mark Heller, ed., *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

⁵See Mishal, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-116.

⁶See Garfinkle, "Negotiating by Proxy: Jordanian Foreign Policy and U.S. Options in the Middle East," *Orbis*, winter, 1981.

There was also a trade deficit of over \$2.6 billion, reflecting a ratio of the value of imports to the value of exports of roughly 8.5 to 1.⁷ To help balance the ledger, in 1982 Jordan received from the Arab states between \$800 million and \$1 billion; remittances to Jordan from skilled Jordanian workers abroad, primarily in the Arab Gulf states, added \$1.14 billion. Jordan also receives about \$10 million annually from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which also employs over 2,500 people. In other words, an extraordinary percentage of the money Jordan uses to make purchases from abroad, to pay its army and civil service, and to maintain and employ the country's most politically volatile population group, comes from outside the country.

The influx of money, however, has political strings and the fickle character of inter-Arab alignments threatens Jordan's ability to plan its development smoothly. Jordan is also an indirect beneficiary of the new age of Arab oil wealth. The fragility of these arrangements has recently become clear. In 1983, revenues from the Arab states may not exceed \$750 million; as of September, less than \$500 million had been received. Remittances from Jordanian workers abroad may total less than that; Central Bank officials fear a 40 percent shortfall from 1982 levels.⁸ One reason for this is the international oil glut and the consequent reduction in revenues accruing to the Gulf states. Another is that political divisions in the Arab world are preventing promised donations—notably from Algeria and Libya. Most important, perhaps, Jordan's closest ally, Iraq, is involved in a costly war with Iran. Not only has the war cost Iraq money and reduced its oil revenues to less than one-third the prewar level, it has also made financial demands of over \$40 billion on Jordan's other benefactors, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq did not pay its promised share in 1981 or 1982, but this deficit and others were made up in part by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors. This year, however, officials in Amman doubt that Riyadh will be as generous. Finally, Jordan's most important mineral export, phosphates, will earn less money in 1983 because the international market for that commodity is depressed.

The dependent nature of Jordan's economy has also created other problems. The rush of money into a country with so little inherent wealth has fueled infla-

tion, and this in turn has driven those on the government payroll to demand pay increases that the government has found difficult to meet. While salaries in the private economy rose, government tax revenues did not keep pace—as in most of the Arab east, tax evasion is a sort of national sport in Jordan. In 1980, the government was forced to impose austerity measures and dip into its development fund in order to pacify this crucial labor force.⁹ Since then, the problem has eased, but not disappeared.

Another problem has been a labor shortage and brain drain to the Gulf, where salaries are higher. It is true that the government enjoys the large remittances sent home by Jordanian workers, but the absence of over 300,000 skilled laborers and professionals out of a total East Bank population of less than 2.5 million handicaps national efforts.

Development has also increased Jordan's dependence on other states, and if outside support should evaporate, the whole house of cards could come tumbling down.

A final, less tangible danger of the economic boom Jordan is experiencing is that the nascent hypermaterialism it has spawned may in the long run lead not to stabilizing affluence but to impossible rising expectations, frustration, anomie and perhaps an Islamic fundamentalist backlash (of which there are already some signs). In days past, wealthy individuals hid their riches behind modest exteriors to foil the best efforts of tax collectors. Today, materialism has made a place for itself in the national mentality.

INTERNAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

From the earliest days of the Emirate, Jordan's rulers have been fortunate enough to have outsiders support a crack military force that could double in the pinch as a Praetorian guard. Today, of course, Jordan's military establishment and its internal security forces (*mukhabarat*) are administratively separate, but they are both close to Jordan's main non-Arab benefactor, the United States.

The main purpose of the internal security forces—at least 17,000 strong—is to protect the monarchy in case Jordan's design to integrate its Palestinian population should backfire, whether as the result of not enough prosperity or of too much. Few Palestinians have ever held high positions in the *mukhabarat* and it remains today an East Banker's bailiwick. Another purpose of the *mukhabarat* is to protect Jordan from the machinations of other internal security forces, especially those of Syria. A final purpose, related to both the others, is to oversee Jordan's relations with the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan*), with whom the *mukhabarat* has cultivated a working relationship over the years.

While it is imperative for the internal security forces to remain scrupulously loyal to the monarchy, the

⁷Basic economic data cited come from *The Middle East and North Africa, 1982–1983* (London: Europa Publications, 1983), pp. 525–527; *The Economist Quarterly Economic Review: Syria, Jordan* (various issues); trade data are taken from *Direction of Trade (DOT), 1983* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1983), p. 236, and *DOT*, September, 1983, p. 47.

⁸Discussions with U.S. and Jordanian officials, and see Eric Pace, "Aid to Jordan," *The New York Times*, October 9, 1983, p. 7.

⁹For details, see *Financial Times*, August 11, 1981.

King does not have the luxury of keeping the army entirely in bedouin hands. At the highest levels, still, the army is commanded by Zaid bin Shaker, the King's maternal uncle. But the regional arms race between Israel and Syria, abetted by the United States and the Soviet Union, has made the effectiveness of a small, narrowly avuncular professional force questionable even for minimal defense. Starting in 1976, conscription became mandatory, and Jordan has tried to create a popular army loyal to the monarchy.

This is a risk that must be taken. Jordan faces potential problems from stronger neighbors on three of its four borders—with Israel, Syria and Iraq. Iraq is politically at ease with Jordan today, but this has not always been the case. The Jordanians fear Israeli policy, especially under the Likud, which has cast aspersions on the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy, but an overt military invasion by Israel is thought less likely than the forcible expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan. The real problem is Syria, with whom Jordan fought in 1970 and with whom it has been embroiled in serious argument almost constantly since 1980. Jordan knows well that Syria has adopted the Hashemite concept of a "Greater Syria," but it sees Syria as the ruler of such an empire. Jordan is seen as a "natural extension" of Syrian territory, and Palestine is viewed as "southern Syria." Jordanians are increasingly worried that Damascus might try to use its almost total domination of the military forces of the PLO to unseat Hussein and install a puppet Palestinian government in Amman.

Jordanian military experts know that they cannot defeat either Israel or Syria without help, but they hope to make any military campaign against them so costly that it will create some degree of deterrence.

The problem is that Jordan not only needs a larger army, but it needs more modern weapons (particularly air defense systems and aircraft) to field even a minimal deterrent. Jordan's military totals about 71,000 uniformed personnel and has about 1,000 operational tanks. Syria commands an armed force of over 200,000 with 4,000 modern tanks. Israel can muster 180,000 soldiers and just under 3,500 tanks.¹⁰

To offset mammoth aircraft imbalances, Jordan is

seeking another 160 first-line fighter aircraft and a modern, mobile, integrated air defense system, preferably from the United States. But to put Jordan on a solid defensive military footing, according to a United States study of Jordan's needs, would cost between \$6 billion and \$10 billion. This means that Jordan would require \$400–\$700 million in United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits and loans over a decade to provide a stable, assimilable procurement pattern.¹¹ There are two major problems, however, one political, one financial. The United States Congress has demonstrated that it will not grant permission for major sales to Jordan unless Jordan joins United States-sponsored peace negotiations. Moreover, even if Congress could be persuaded that arming Jordan against Syria was sufficiently autotelic to warrant doing, the cost of the program would jeopardize Jordan's development plans. Obviously, Amman faces difficult choices.

There are actions Jordan is taking to compensate for its military vulnerabilities. Most important, Jordan maintains close ties with the United States and the United States military. Washington knows it can count on Jordanian support in training and building up the forces of many Gulf States—notably Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—thus contributing to a sort of local Arab rapid deployment force.¹²

JORDAN AND THE REAGAN PLAN

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June, 1982, and the subsequent responses of United States, Syrian, Saudi and Israeli diplomacy have had the effect of telescoping Jordan's problems and choices. The Reagan Plan¹³ in particular, by placing Jordan at the pivot of future United States efforts to resolve the central issues of the Arab-Israeli dispute, magnified the danger to Jordan from those parties most deeply opposed to United States policy: the Syrian regime and its Palestinian allies, and the Israeli Likud government. On the other hand, United States policy enhanced Jordan's regional stature and its importance to the United States; if properly managed, this could be parlayed into access to more money and more arms, the ultimate success or failure of United States policy notwithstanding. Moreover, the United States blunder of springing the Reagan Plan too soon—before the panoply of intruders in Lebanon could be separated and sent home—provided Jordan not only with additional time but also with new opportunities.

It is clear that during the incubation period of the

(Continued on page 38)

¹⁰Figures are from "Israelis Penetrate Jordanian Airspace," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, June 27, 1983, p. 57.

¹¹"Jordan Seeks Weapon Advances," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, June 27, 1982, pp. 39, 41.

¹²For rumors of Jordanian forces serving as United States interventionary proxies in the Gulf, see Robert C. Toth, "Jordanian Strike-Force: U.S. Revising Old Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 1983, p. 20. For Jordan's denial of the rumor, see "Statement by the Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces," Jordan Information Bureau, Washington, D.C., October 17, 1983.

¹³President Reagan's Middle East Peace Plan was announced September 1, 1982; for excerpts see *Current History*, January, 1983, p. 33.

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"Today, Syria is unable to gain greater political legitimacy at home; it pursues policies contradictory to Baathist doctrine and spends enormous ideological and material resources in Lebanon. . . . [But] the regime has done better than most of its friends or enemies thought possible."

Syria in the Maelstrom

BY ROBERT OLSON

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SYRIA was caught in the maelstrom of Middle East politics in 1982–1983.¹ The problems confronting Syria, the options available to it, and the policies followed by the government of President Hafez Assad were largely determined by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982. Since Syria's policies from June, 1982, to October, 1983, were largely reactions to Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Israel's objectives must be emphasized.

Israel had four major objectives, somewhat in the following order of priority: (1) Israel urgently needed access to the waters of the southern Lebanese region, especially the Litani River basin and the Mt. Hermon watershed area. The occupation and probable annexation of South Lebanon will also give greater security to the water resources of northern and eastern Israel that flow from Jordan; (2) Israel wished to crush the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and deal a destructive blow to Palestinian institutions; (3) Israel sought a more acquiescent Palestinian leadership and population on the occupied West Bank that would yield to permanent Israeli control; (4) Israeli policies were to be consolidated by supporting and placing the Phalangist party of the Gemayal faction in power in Lebanon.

The Phalangists would be anti-Palestinian, anti-Syrian and amenable to a peace treaty with Israel, which would allow Israel a larger role in the economy of Lebanon. Israel thought these aims could be obtained by the election of Bashir Gemayal as President of Lebanon in the elections scheduled for September, 1982; then Israel would have a decisive voice in determining the election results.

Syria had to consider Israeli objectives; it also had

¹I wish to express my thanks to Elizabeth Picard for giving me a copy of her paper and for permission to quote from it.

²See Leonard Binder, "U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Exploiting New Opportunities," *Current History*, January, 1983, pp. 2–3.

³This is supported by other news accounts of May, 1982, which indicate a heavy flow of politicians, military and intelligence personnel between Washington and Israel.

⁴Joe Stork and Martha Wenger, "Aid to Israel: The Cen-

to act with the realization that the United States supported the Israeli invasion. Contrary to many reports that the United States and its Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, supported the invasion only until Israel obtained a 25-mile "security zone" in south Lebanon, it seems likely that the United States supported the Israeli push to Beirut. Several reasons support this contention. During Haig's tenure, President Ronald Reagan's administration had adopted a policy of "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union, a consensus in which Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan were to join.

An obstacle to this policy was the "question of Lebanon." In April and May, 1982, Haig indicated that Israeli action in Lebanon would not be opposed by the United States.² This further encouraged Israel's belief that it had the backing of the United States to invade Lebanon.³ From Haig's point of view, "bringing the Syrians to heel" would facilitate the acceptance of a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union by Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Syria's defeat (or a sufficient military humiliation) by Israel in Lebanon would further weaken and isolate Syria, especially in regional Arab politics. Syria would then be forced to accept the Camp David accords which, by this time, meant the recognition through international and public law of Israel's incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza.

In addition, the United States undoubtedly had its global objectives, chief of which was to pursue aggressive political and military policies vis-à-vis a Soviet Union perceived to be economically and technologically weak. The United States realized that its dominant position with regard to the Soviet Union would allow it increased access to the raw materials and markets of its third world allies. In the Middle East, this meant that the United States would further increase the industrial expansion and accelerated economic growth of Israel.

These policies, supported by the Reagan administration, are reflected in the General Accounting Office (GAO) report on aid to Israel⁴ and by Thomas Stauffer's article on United States aid to Israel. Stauffer's calculations are that the direct (economic and military)

and indirect (investment, private borrowing, technology transfer) United States aid to Israel may reach \$12 billion in 1983–1984.⁵ This would mean that each Israeli family of five would be receiving nearly \$20,000 dollars each or, put another way, United States aid to Israel would pay for all of Israel's imports. Such vast amounts of aid mean the continued United States support of the industrial expansion of Israel and Israel's continued need for additional land and water resources. The state that can most easily supply both these necessities, at least for the next 10 or 15 years, is Lebanon.

SYRIAN RESPONSES

Syria adopted various responses commensurate with its abilities to meet the challenges posed by the Israeli invasion. Regarding Israel's first objective of securing greater land and water resources, there was little Syria could do. Israel had secured access to the Litani River basin as a result of its March, 1978, invasion of Lebanon. Furthermore, Israel had annexed the Golan Heights on December 14, 1981, for the purpose, among others, of securing the heights to protect Israel's national water carrier system that lies adjacent to and underneath the heights and within reach of medium-range artillery. Until the situation in Lebanon was resolved in its favor, Syria realized it would be able to do little to retain the heights or stop Israel from occupying southern Lebanon.

Syria had a more complex response to the second Israeli objective: to crush the PLO. From its intervention in Lebanon in 1976 to the summer of 1983, Syria wanted to leave the PLO in the south of Lebanon to act as a buffer between its forces and Israel. The PLO presence became even more valuable after the 1978 Israeli invasion.

But after the destruction of a good deal of the PLO military infrastructure in the summer of 1982, the PLO was no longer a buffer between Syrian and Israeli forces. Subsequently, Syria supported the faction of the PLO that favored an armed struggle to secure a democratic secular state in Palestine. The PLO dissidents, who remained a distinct minority within the PLO, thought it was a mistake to have evacuated Beirut and to have accepted United States guarantees of protection for Palestinian civilians.⁶ As early as March, 1983, armed conflict broke out in the Bekaa Valley

between the dissidents led by Abu Musa and Yasir Arafat's Fatah-faction loyalists. Syria supported the dissidents materially and ideologically.

ECONOMIC POLICY

An economic policy for "Greater Syria" had been actively pursued by Assad after his accession to power in 1970. Further integration and interpenetration among the economies of Lebanon, Jordan and Syria were part of the projected common economic action. Syria's balance of trade with the Arab states as compared to its trade with Europe is negative. For example, in 1979 Syria imported £S2,636 worth of goods and exported £S759 million worth of goods to the Arab states; it imported £S3,000 and exported £S3,917 to European countries. In other words, the value of Syria's commercial exchanges with the Arab world was only 17 percent of its total trade in 1979.⁷ This is a rather dismal figure for a country that stressed the "complementarity of the economies of the Arab world."

But this poor trade record was not true of trade between Syria and Lebanon. In fact, the complementarity of the economies of Syria and Lebanon was stressed as early as January, 1975, at a meeting between Assad and Suleiman Franjeh, the President of Lebanon.

The economies of the two countries complement one another naturally, physically and humanly. They are likely to move more and more towards complementarity and, later on, towards fusion. . . . These two states which are truly one country in many aspects: economic, demographic, historical, cultural and so on . . . cannot remain eternally separate.⁸

The trade between Syria and Lebanon is reflected in the table below. It should be noted there was a great jump in Lebanese exports to Syria after the January, 1975, Shtaura meeting between Assad and Franjeh. The civil war of 1975–1976 and the Syrian intervention in Lebanon increased the trade, especially the Lebanon-to-Syria trade, during this period. While the figures for 1980–1983 are not available, it seems unlikely there has been a decrease as a result of a change of policy. A decrease in trade could be attributed to the general economic deterioration of the Lebanese economy, and for that matter, of the Syrian economy as well.

Trade between Syria and Lebanon

(Value in millions of Lebanese pounds)

	Syria to Lebanon	Lebanon to Syria
1971	35	76
1973	52	77
1975	15	130
1977	54	158
1979	38	166

sored GAO Report," *MERIP Reports*, no. 117 (September, 1983), pp. 28–30.

⁵Thomas R. Stauffer, "U.S. Aid to Israel: The Vital Link," *Middle East Problem Paper*, no. 24 (1983).

⁶For details see Michael Hudson, "The Palestinians After Lebanon," *Current History*, January, 1983, p. 34.

⁷Elizabeth Picard, "Conflicting Areas of Syrian Economic Policy." Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association meeting, Philadelphia, November, 4–7, 1982, p. 4.

⁸I obtained this reference from Picard's quotation of *Syrie et Monde Arabe*, no. 252 (January, 1975).

Elizabeth Picard, a French authority on Syria, has written that these figures, however, do not adequately indicate the economic interdependence between Syria and Lebanon. Syria also considers that the Syrian capital that fled to Beirut from 1950 to 1975 and which amounted to 300 million Syrian pounds between 1950 and 1960 alone (and may well have been much greater during the decade of the 1970's) contributed greatly to Lebanon's development.⁹ Indeed from 1950 to 1975, total Syrian capital in Beirut may well have been in the neighborhood of 1 billion Syrian pounds.

There was, however, a reverse flow of some of this capital after the civil war of 1975–1976. It should be noted that the Baathist “socialist” regime of Syria feels an obligation to protect this Syrian capital in Lebanon—an obligation not without some ideological irony but solidly based on the principles of Assad’s “corrective movement” of 1970. The owners of that capital expect protection of their money and investments in Lebanon.

This was undoubtedly one of the reasons the Syrian government intervened in Lebanon in 1976. The abandonment of Lebanon to a Christian-dominated economy in league with the Israeli, United States and European multinational corporations would be anathema to Syrian capitalists; it would increase the vulnerability of Assad’s regime and decimate the policies that it has pursued for the past 14 years. For this reason alone, Syria needed a presence in Lebanon.

SYRIA'S NEED FOR LEBANON

If Syria were deprived of its economic space in Lebanon, it would become a ward of the Arab world, mainly Saudi Arabia's. Without the potential of a Lebanon-projected economic arena, and with its weak economy and its lackadaisical industrial development, Lebanon would be increasingly liable to become an economic appendage to the Israeli industrial and technological machine. This is what Israel and the United States, and (by the recent show of force in the eastern Mediterranean) the European countries want as well.

The Syrians also contend that a great number of Syrian workers, probably as many as 500,000 during the 1970's, some of whom subsequently returned as soldiers, have contributed immensely to the industrialization of Lebanon.¹⁰ During the 1960's and 1970's the Beirut port facilities and many of its construction companies were manned by Syrians. These are just a few examples of Syria's concern for its economic space.

Syria followed similar economic policies toward Jordan. One of the major differences in the trade balance between Syria and Jordan in the 1970's and the balance between Syria and Lebanon was that Syria ex-

ported nearly three times as much to Jordan as to Lebanon, while Jordan's exports to Syria were about the same as those of Lebanon's.¹¹

Trade between Syria and Jordan

(Value in millions of Syrian pounds)

	Syria to Jordan	Jordan to Syria
1971	15	18
1973	37	30
1975	49	51
1979	110	178

THE PALESTINIANS

Because of its economic interests, even during the 1970's Syria was concerned about the burgeoning Palestinian economic strength represented by SAMED, a Palestinian industrial concern that was reported to have had around 50,000 employees encroaching on Syrian economic space. This Syrian–Palestinian economic rivalry became hostile political rivalry in the aftermath of the siege of Beirut. As early as 1976, Assad reportedly told Arafat.

You do not represent the Palestinians any more than we do. Do not forget, there is no Palestinian entity. There is Syria. You are an integral part of the Syrian people; Palestine is an integral part of Syria.

By October, 1983, Assad's position obtained. The PLO forces were pushed into a small enclave around Tripoli, and Arafat was predicting an imminent Syrian push to consolidate further its control over northern Lebanon. The PLO was more responsive to Syrian concerns and more dependent on Syria, an established Arab state. It was, however, an unwanted dependency for the PLO and one that was bound to be a contentious and violent one.

There was little Syria could do regarding Israel's imposition of its rule on the West Bank. But Syria opposed the Camp David accords and President Reagan's Middle East peace proposal of September 1, 1983, because it felt that acceptance of these proposals would result in a condominium of power between the Palestinians and Jordan. Either one would have violated what Syria considers to be its economic space and the military leverage to control that space. A federation of power between the West Bank and Jordan would also isolate Syria further in Lebanon. Acceptance of President Reagan's proposal and of a peace treaty between the Lebanese Phalange and Israel would have created an economic space consisting of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank.

If such a federation could be established, vast amounts of United States capital, both government and private, would pour into Israel and be diffused throughout the new “economic area.” The successful implementation of this policy would destroy the policies of the Baathist pan-Syrian and greater Syrian eco-

⁹Picard, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹This table is taken from Picard, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

conomic sphere so assiduously pursued by the Assad government since 1970. Acquiescence to the Israeli and United States demands would probably mean the toppling of the Assad government within a year or two. It would mean the final emasculation of what remains of Baathism and, possibly, the destabilization of Syria.

The implications of the Israeli and Syrian policies are not lost on the critics of Syria, who charge that, in the elimination of the PLO from the politics of Lebanon, the Syrians and Israelis share common policies—even if for different goals. This claim has merit.

Syria vehemently opposed the election of Bashir Gemayal as President of Lebanon. It also opposed the succession of Amin Gemayal to the presidency after Bashir was killed on September 14, 1982. Syria knew that the ascent of the Phalange to power militated against all that it had striven for since 1970. Syria's entire efforts from the beginning of Israeli-Lebanese negotiations in November, 1983, to the signing of a peace treaty between them on May 17, 1983, was to undermine the political alignment that would allow the articles of the treaty to be implemented.

In a way (at least up to October, 1983), Syria scored a nominal victory. In his attempts to reconcile the various factions in Lebanon to his rule, Amin Gemayal has not yet asked the Lebanese Parliament for ratification of the treaty. The major Syrian objections to the treaty are found in articles 3, 7 and 8, which stipulate that Israel is to have a "security zone" of several hundred square miles in south Lebanon and in article 8, sections 1B and 2, which state that Israel and Lebanon are "to conclude agreements on the movement of goods, products and persons."¹²

The Syrian strategy to impede the implementation of the peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon was based on its earlier policies of supporting minorities vis-à-vis established Sunni leadership in Syria and Lebanon. This had been a practice of the Syrian government under Assad since 1970 and it accelerated after 1975, while Assad's "corrective movement" was pursued. Assad himself and most of the top leadership of Syria, the army, the Baath party and the government itself were part of the Shia Alawite minority of Syria, which comprises about 11 percent of the Syrian population. There are also significant numbers of Christian Greek Orthodox, who comprise about 15 percent of the population and support the Assad regime, even if at times somewhat lukewarmly.

By means of this minorities-oriented policy Assad was able to support whichever group in Lebanon was most amenable to the policies of establishing a greater Syrian economic space in the eastern Arab Mediterranean area. Thus Syria was able to intervene on the

side of the Maronite (Catholic) Christians in 1976 against the PLO and the National Movement forces of the Druse, some Sunni and some Shiite groups. In 1976, the Syrians thought, the Maronites, under the presidency of Suleiman Franjeh, would support the expanded role of Syria in Lebanon—a process that gathered momentum at the Shtaura meeting in January, 1975. But important elements within the Maronite community, especially the National Liberal party of Camille Chamoun, the Maronite Monk Orders, led by Father Sharbal Qasis, and their respective militias became resentful of Syrian activities in Lebanon and by 1975 had shifted toward a relationship with Israel. Syria, in turn, shifted its support to the National Movement forces.

Factionalism among the Maronite community contributed to Israel's failure to impose its control on Lebanon and even to its inability to control the areas that its army controlled after its 1982 invasion. The Gemayal government's inability to consolidate its power led to the Israeli decision to withdraw its forces from the Shuf Mountains in early September, 1983. (Considering future options, Israel had given arms to the Druse as well as to the Maronites before withdrawing.) Indicative of the split among the Maronites was the fact that Franjeh, the former Maronite President of Lebanon, was a leader of the new National Salvation Front, the partially resurrected National Movement, which was headed by Druse leader Walid Jumblat.

SYRIAN SUPPORT

When Israel pulled its forces back from the Shuf-Druse area on September 4–6, the Syrian-supported line-up was clear: Syria backed the National Salvation Front (NSF) forces composed of the Druse led by Walid Jumblat, the Muslim leader Rashid Karami of northern Lebanon, and Suleiman Franjeh, a Maronite and a northern neighbor of Karami's and therefore in the economic space of Syria. Saeb Salam, the veteran Muslim Sunni leader from Beirut, had also joined the NSF in September even though earlier he had been against all "foreign forces" in Lebanon and hence an indirect supporter of the May 17, 1983, peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon. The NSF was also cooperating closely with Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal Shiite organization. It is important to re-

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¹²There is a copy of the treaty in *American-Arab Affairs*, no. 5 (summer, 1983), pp. 208–211, with an annex of the security arrangements on pp. 211–221.

Robert Olson's latest book is *The Ba'th and Syria, 1947–1982: The Evolution of Ideology, Party and State* (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1982). He is also the author of *The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718–1743: A Study of Rebellion in the Capital and War in Provinces of the Ottoman Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975). He is also the coeditor of *Iran: Essays on a Revolution in the Making* (Lexington, Ken.: Mazda Press, 1981):

"Given conditions in Lebanon and the war between Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia faces considerable danger. But barring attacks by Iran on the production and shipment of Saudi oil, there is substantial evidence that the heirs of King Abdul Azziz have created a viable society that can defend itself and survive the current threats."

Saudi Arabian Oil Policies

BY RAMON KNAUERHASE

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ON September 14, 1960, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela announced the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The organization's overall objective was

the unification of petroleum policies for the member countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding the interests of member countries individually and collectively. [Second Resolution]

Between 1960 and 1970, OPEC managed to gain some concessions from the major oil companies. Saudi Arabia negotiated several modifications in its basic agreement with ARAMCO, which raised the average per barrel receipt about 20 percent. OPEC's struggle to wrest oil pricing control from the oil companies intensified after the overthrow of Libya's King Idris by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, who informed the companies operating in Libya that prices were too low and demanded an increase in the posted price from \$1.80 to \$2.20 per barrel. The companies refused; but following a series of negotiations, OPEC won a 21 percent price increase for Arabian Light crude oil.¹ Additional price increases were scheduled to take place by 1975.

SECRET POLICYMAKING

What explains Saudi actions between 1970 and 1980? Any answer to this question must be somewhat speculative because Saudi oil policymaking is shrouded in deepest secrecy. In theory, the King makes all decisions. But, because this is an impossible task, he is supported by three advisory bodies. At the top of the advisory system is the Council of Senior Princes (Higher Committee). The Council of Senior Princes is the connecting link between the King and the royal family, and in practice its recommendations are binding on the King. Below the Senior Princes is the Coun-

cil of Ministers. It consists of all "active Ministers who are appointed by a Royal Order . . . [and advisers] who are appointed by a Royal Order to be active members in the Council" and anyone whom the King desires to be active in the Council.² The Council represents a wide spectrum of interests within the government and its recommendations must be approved by the King. Oil policy is largely outside its purview; policymaking in that area is the sphere of the Higher Petroleum Council. This council is made up of a number of ministers and experts; it sets broad policy outlines and decides how these should be implemented, subject to the final approval of the King. The Ministry of Petroleum is the major source of information and implements the decisions of the Higher Petroleum Council.

The kingdom's large reserves and output capacity make Saudi Arabia the leading oil producer in the non-Communist world. It provides such a large share of the world oil supply that its decision on how much to produce has a significant price effect. In 1981, for example, Saudi Arabia produced 23.14 percent of non-Communist and 42.44 percent of OPEC output. When making output decisions, Saudi policymakers have two choices: restrict output and sell as much as possible at the highest price possible, or expand output and sell at a lower price. The first choice implies that they are acting as any entrepreneur would, trying to maximize total profits over the long run (i.e., they maximize wealth); the second suggests that the policymakers are pursuing a nonmaximizing policy based in part on noneconomic factors. Either policy option is subject to certain constraints.

Maximum output capacity is the key element to Saudi Arabia's price leadership in the OPEC cartel. World demand for oil and non-OPEC supply of oil determine OPEC's total output. In theory, Saudi Arabia sets the price at which all the members produce as much as they can, with Saudi Arabia supplying the rest. To enforce its price decisions, the Saudis must be able to manipulate their own output to force noncomplying members into line. In times of high demand for oil, the Saudis must be able to supply all quantities

¹Arabian Light crude oil (34° API gravity) is the official OPEC marker (reference) crude oil that is used to calculate the price of all other oil. Official OPEC price announcements refer to this quality oil.

²Fouad Al-Farsy, *Saudi Arabia* (London: Stacey International, 1978), p. 127.

demand at their price. Without excess capacity the Saudis could not be sure that they could enforce their prices and prevent the remaining cartel members from forcing prices upward. In periods of low demand the Saudis must lower their output to maintain their price.

As the owner of the largest reserves in the non-Communist world, Saudi Arabia must prevent prices from rising so high that conservation and the substitution of alternative energy sources threaten future revenues. Over the past ten years the Oil Minister, Sheik Zaki Yamani, has stressed that this is an important cornerstone of Saudi oil policy.

OIL PRICE INCREASES

Events since 1970 have been highlighted by three significant oil price increases. The first shock was the 21 percent increase negotiated in Teheran and Tripoli on February 14, 1971, and April 2, 1971, respectively. It signaled the end of cheap oil. The second shock was initiated by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) on October 16, 1973, which was followed by an additional increase effective January 1, 1974. The third price shock began in April, 1979, and ended in March, 1980. Further increases took place in September, 1980, and November, 1981.

The years between the Teheran and Tripoli agreements and October, 1973, were a period of learning. The Saudis had become major actors in the world energy markets but were inexperienced in that role. It had become clear that to achieve the aims of their first economic development plan higher revenues than those received in the late 1960's would be required. The plan's implementation, however, was in its early stages and during the first two plan years revenues exceeded expenditures by a comfortable margin. Furthermore, a 26 percent increase in average daily production in 1972 had been absorbed by the market without weakening prices. Thus there was little need for additional revenues, given the rate of expenditures, and the Saudis did not pursue an active oil price policy. Their main concern was to protect the real price of a barrel of oil and to avoid sudden price increases that might destabilize the market.

During the early part of 1973, world demand for crude oil increased, causing upward pressure on spot prices.³ Gasoline shortages developed in some parts of the United States and there was talk of an energy crisis.

³Spot prices are noncontract prices determined by the demand for and supply of oil in the noncontract market. They are an indicator of general conditions in the oil market. When contract prices and spot prices are about the same the oil market is in balance.

⁴Abdulhady H. Taher, "The Middle East Oil and Gas Policy," *The Journal of Energy and Development*, spring, 1978.

⁵Paul Stevens, "Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy in the 1970's," published in Tim Niblock, ed., *State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 217.

In the wake of the third Arab-Israeli war of October, 1973, Saudi Arabia raised the price of Arabian Light from \$3.00 to \$5.12 and announced a selective oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands. Two months later, at its regular meeting in December, OPEC announced an additional \$6.53 increase effective January 1, 1974.

The October price increase was made to take advantage of circumstances and to achieve a price level that the Saudis considered reasonable and fair. Saudi officials have argued that these increases were needed, because

international oil prices prevailing before the OPEC price decision of 1973 and 1974 were exceptionally below their competitive levels and were encouraging extremely wasteful uses of energy as well as inordinate dependence on the rapidly depleting oil resources.⁴

An additional motive, however, was Saudi Arabia's frustration with United States Middle East policy. In April and July, 1973, the Saudis had stated that they would not increase output to relieve pressure on spot prices unless the United States gave more support to the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The warning went unheeded, which led to the oil price increase and the embargo on oil exports to the United States and the Netherlands. There is evidence that the second increase announced by OPEC in December at its Teheran meeting was not part of the government's strategy. Sheik Yamani's support of this increase was a response to Iranian pressure, and he was reprimanded for going above the October 16 increase.⁵

Production was unstable in 1974 and 1975 but the price increase held. The embargo had little influence. Spot prices declined from their high in November, 1973, and the market was in overall balance. But at the end of 1976 the first disagreement within OPEC since the 1973 embargo developed, resulting in the so-called "split-level" price increase of January 1, 1977. Saudi Arabia, supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), raised its price 5 percent and the other OPEC members increased theirs 10 percent. To enforce its decision Saudi Arabia raised its output to an average of 9.3 mbd in the first and 9.4 mbd in the second quarter of 1977. Because of the relative cheapness of Saudi oil, demand declined for other OPEC oil.

Price unity was restored in July when Saudi Arabia raised its contract price 5 percent to \$12.70 and lowered its output by an average of 400,000 bd for the rest of the year. The price of Arabian Light remained at \$12.70 for the rest of 1977 and all of 1978. Spot prices declined, indicating that the market had returned to equilibrium. An important reason for the price decline was the low level of demand for OPEC oil due to inventory reductions. This set the stage for the events of 1979-1980.

The Saudis clearly acted to maximize wealth between 1974 and 1978. This can be deduced from the

relationship between actual production and technical capacity. From 1974 to September, 1978, production was far below technical capacity, leading to considerable shut-in (reserve) capacity. Thus Saudi Arabia had the ability to increase its market share simply by raising its output. That the Saudis did not do so indicates that they thought they had determined their demand curve and were selling their output at the profit-maximizing price. They behaved as the price leader in a cartel should, all the while claiming that they were acting with moderation to prevent adverse effects on the world economy. True moderation would have led them to stay with their five percent increment of December, 1976, rather than meeting the price hawks' ten percent increase of December, 1976. They certainly had the excess capacity to continue production near 10 mbd had they wanted to force the noncooperating members to accept the lower price.

INSTABILITY IN IRAN

By September, 1978, it was clear that a political crisis was developing in Iran, and revolutionary agitation in the oil fields raised uncertainty about Iran's ability to supply its customers. In anticipation of shortages and price increases, oil buyers entered the spot market to build up inventories. To contain the consequences of Iran's possible failure to supply its share of OPEC production, Saudi Arabia increased its output to an average of 10 mbd in the fourth quarter of 1978, but spot prices continued to rise. Against this background, OPEC met in December and agreed on a series of moderate quarterly price increases totaling 14.5 percent by October, 1979.

For a moment it appeared that the strategy would work. Spot prices rose sharply in February, 1979, but declined somewhat in March and April. In March, the first of the planned quarterly increases went into effect, raising the price of a barrel of marker crude from \$13.34 to \$15.68. Meanwhile, Iran resumed production and lifted 2.2 mbd in March, and Saudi Arabia reduced its output by one million barrels daily in anticipation of Iran's complete resumption of pre-revolution production. The additional output failed to materialize and spot prices soared from \$21.40 in April to \$35.40 in June. OPEC accelerated its scheduled increases, raising the price of Arabian Light to \$14.55 for the second quarter and decreed an additional increase to \$18 in June. At the same time Saudi Arabia returned its output to 9.8 mbd and kept it at this level until October, 1980.

Despite the kingdom's increased production, spot prices rose rapidly, reaching a high of \$41 in November and December, 1979. Then OPEC's unified price structure broke down. While Saudi Arabia continued to sell its output at \$18, the other producers sold their output at far higher prices. The December OPEC ministers meeting in Caracas failed to reach a unified

price structure, and Saudi Arabia raised its price to \$24, retroactive to November 1, 1980. This brought the kingdom's selling price briefly in line with the others' for the last two months of the year.

Continued high Saudi output and the United States recession, which began in January, 1980, weakened demand. Spot prices declined in January and February to about \$36 for Arabian crude, considerably above the Saudi price for marker crude. Taking advantage of the continued tightness in the market, OPEC kept its "effective marker" price above the Saudi selling price. To close the gap, Saudi Arabia raised its price to \$26, retroactive to January 1. This failed to eliminate the difference, and in May Saudi Arabia raised its price an additional \$2, retroactive to April. In view of the continued tight market conditions, as reflected in the high level of spot prices, OPEC raised its effective marker price from \$32 to \$37 in June, while Saudi Arabia kept its price at \$28.

A SAUDI MISCALCULATION

Much has been written about Saudi Arabia's role and its motives in these events; the best answer seems to be that the Saudi policymakers miscalculated and lost control when they reduced output in the second quarter of 1979. The anticipated resumption of Iranian output failed to materialize. The one million barrel reduction in Saudi output aggravated conditions and Saudi Arabia lost control over the marker price. As noted earlier, Saudi control over OPEC prices is constrained by its excess capacity. Technical capacity had fallen from 11.5 mbd in December, 1976, to slightly below 10 mbd in June, 1980. Thus the return to an output level of 9.5 mbd eliminated almost all shut-in capacity, depriving Saudi Arabia of its room for maneuver. Unable to control output and prices, the Saudis played catch-up with the effective OPEC price. It simply made no sense to sell its oil at prices considerably below that of the other OPEC members when it had no effect on the market.

For a moment it appeared that order might be returning to the oil market. Saudi Arabia's continuing high output and the recession reduced pressure on spot prices, which began to decline in June and in August, 1980, reached the effective OPEC marker price. In September, Iraq invaded Iran. World supplies were threatened and spot prices rose rapidly, reaching the record level of the last two months of 1979. Saudi Arabia raised its price to \$30 in the same month and imposed an additional \$2 increase, bringing the effective OPEC price and the Saudi selling price roughly in line. To prevent further price increases the Saudis raised output to 10.3 mbd, eliminating virtually all shut-in capacity. In January, 1981, despite a slight easing of spot prices, OPEC raised its price to \$37 while the Saudis held their price at \$32. Between January and September the Saudis kept out-

put at full technical capacity and spot prices continued to decline until June, when the spot and OPEC selling prices of Arabian Light converged at \$32, indicating a return to less strained conditions in the world oil market.

The sharply falling spot prices during the first six months of 1981 revealed the existence of surplus production. The OPEC ministers met in Geneva in June, 1981, and decided to freeze prices; but Saudi Arabia refused to lower output to reduce the price spread with OPEC. Two months later, the OPEC ministers met again to try to establish a unified price. They failed to reach an agreement because Saudi Arabia refused to go above \$34 while the others called for \$35 or more. Sheik Yamani announced that the Saudi price would remain at \$32 through 1982. To offset the developing oversupply, he announced a production ceiling of 9 mbd effective September 1, 1981. This reduction led to a slight increase in spot prices. By November spot prices and OPEC prices were about in line and Saudi Arabia raised its price to \$34; it appeared that the market might have stabilized.

This was an illusion, and it is unlikely that anyone really believed it. By the end of 1981 the recession and conservation measures had combined to lower demand; and unintended inventory accumulation occurred. In the United States, petroleum consumption had declined 16 percent from its high in 1978 and energy consumption per dollar of GNP (gross national product) had fallen over 17 percent between 1973 and 1981. Similar reductions had been achieved in the other major industrialized nations.

Owing to these factors spot prices fell below contract prices and fluctuated between \$30 and \$33 for the remainder of 1981. A period of oversupply had arrived. In an effort to maintain the contract price of \$34, Saudi Arabia reduced output from 9 mbd in December, 1981, to 5.1 mbd in December, 1982. OPEC was in disarray. While the Saudis attempted to prop up the contract price, the other members offered various discounts from the contract price, trying to sell as much as possible to prevent revenue losses. By the end of 1982 it was clear that the contract price was too high. Worldwide economic conditions had deteriorated and the recession was the worst since the depression of the 1930's. Spot prices declined to \$28.50 in March, 1983, and Saudi output fell to 3.4 mbd in the same month. The existence of OPEC was threatened.

There was only one road to survival. The members had to bury their animosity, to stop trying to gain advantage over each other, and to agree on a common policy to prevent a major price decline. In a series of meetings in February, 1983, the OPEC ministers hammered out an agreement. They lowered the marker price to \$29, limited total output to 17.5 mbd, and assigned each member an output quota; Saudi Arabia resumed its role as the swing producer.

The success of this agreement depended on several factors: Saudi Arabia's willingness to produce at extremely low levels in the foreseeable future; continued willingness of the other members not to exceed their quotas; the behavior of the major non-OPEC producers (Mexico, Britain and the Soviet Union); and worldwide economic recovery.

By October, 1983, it appeared that stability had returned to the oil market. In July, 1983, the OPEC ministers decided to stick with the current quotas and output ceiling despite some disagreement.

The United Kingdom, Mexico and the Soviet Union have acted in support of the new price structure. This is especially true of Great Britain. The British National Oil Company (BNOC) established a two-tier price system to assure Nigeria that it is not trying to draw customers away from Nigerian suppliers. This was a significant step, because Nigeria was one of the early OPEC price cutters. Furthermore, Mexico and the Soviet Union have maintained their output levels since the beginning of 1983 and have refrained from price cuts that could upset the current price stability.

The world economic recovery has been weak. Nevertheless, it has contributed to the current, relatively stable conditions in the oil market. Unofficial estimates suggest that OPEC output passed the 18 mbd output mark in August, 1983. Although Saudi Arabia seems to have absorbed most of the increase and is currently producing 500,000 mbd above its quota, there has been little disagreement within OPEC regarding the kingdom's action. The Saudis have argued that it is their right to take advantage of the firming market because of the considerable sacrifices they made to support the \$29 price. But Iran has objected, charging that increased Saudi production has benefited Iraq. (Press reports suggest that Saudi Arabia has been selling the increased output to France at \$34 a barrel; this allegedly helps reduce Iraq's mounting debt for purchases of French armaments.)

The key to the survival of OPEC is Saudi Arabia, which raises the question: Do the Saudis have the political will to act as the swing producer even if it means low levels of output and low levels of revenues? In the past, some analysts have asserted that Saudi Arabia must produce at the highest possible level of output to meet the demands of its domestic economic development plan as well as its international commitments. Lower revenues would force reductions in domestic spending, leading to declines in the Saudi standard of

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SYRIA IN THE MAELSTROM

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alize that this line-up represented all the confessional groups in Lebanon, including Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics as well as Maronites.

By the fall of 1983, Syria was supporting those groups that were willing to cooperate with Syria to create and to sustain a Levantine economic order—a project that needs the approval of the minorities in the area—whether Muslim, Christian or Druse.

The accelerated policies of economic complementarity pursued in the Levant area by Syria are largely a result of the 1973 war and the Egyptian-Israeli accords. Syria has countered an Egyptian effort to join in a condominium of economic sharing with Israel in the eastern Mediterranean markets, with Egypt getting a share of northwest Africa as well. A further strengthening of the Egyptian-Israeli economic détente would lead to strengthened Palestinian potentialities either in a West Bank entity or in a West Bank confederation with Jordan, with a possible eventual Palestinian dominance in Jordan—all under the economic hegemony and military dominance of Israel. These eventualities are deemed profoundly adverse to Syria's interests.

But the United States and Europe are interested in Israeli economic paramountcy. After the Israeli pull-out in early September, 1983, Syria found itself facing a multinational peacekeeping force. The major countries of the Western capitalist world, with the exception of Germany, had an entire navy off the coast of Lebanon. There was a flotilla of some 25 ships and some 25,000 men. The United States itself had some 15,000 to 17,000 men, including 2,000 marines on shore. The French, Italians and British had another 6,000 in addition to 5,000–6,000 offshore.¹³ One must add to this force the score or more of submarines in this area.

SOVIET AID

Syria with the support of its allies met the peacekeeping forces, led by the United States, head on. Indeed, before the arrival of the U.S.S. *New Jersey* and the subsequent cease-fire of September 26, the Syrian-backed Druse and Palestinian forces might have been able to link-up with their Shi'ite-Amal supporters in southern Beirut, causing the collapse of the Amin Gemayal government. Perhaps it is only a coincidence that Syria and its allies agreed to the cease-fire only hours after the battleship *New Jersey* arrived off the shores of Beirut. The *New Jersey's* 16-inch guns are

*The attack could also be seen as retaliation for the bombing of the United States Marine Beirut headquarters in October; the United States accused Syrian-backed Iranians of the attack, which left 239 Americans dead.

¹³The number of ships and men on board is based on *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 14, 1983, and author's estimates.

able to reach nearly all the Syrian positions in the Bekaa Valley.

With even moderate Soviet support, Syria would have been able to put up a stiff resistance: a United States- and European-imposed Gemayal government in Lebanon under Israeli hegemony would mean the scrapping of policies followed for 14 years by the Syrian government. This in turn would mean a Middle East dominated by Israel and the United States, with the Arabs represented by the surrogate countries of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

In these pressing circumstances, the Soviet Union might feel sufficiently threatened to come to Syria's aid to maintain its credibility in the Middle East. There were between 5,000 and 7,000 Soviet advisers and military personnel in Syria; in October, 1983, the U.S.S.R. began to supply the Syrians with SS-21 missiles with a possible range of more than 100 miles; these missiles would seem to be the minimum that Syria would need to obtain the political leverage necessary to defend its interests in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, in early December, United States carrier-based aircraft struck Syrian positions in Lebanon in response to Syrian anti-aircraft fire at unarmed United States reconnaissance planes.* The United States intended to warn that Syria faces increasing pressure if it fails to withdraw from Lebanon.

To this writer it seems highly improbable that Syria will withdraw meaningful forces from Lebanon unless militarily forced to do so, given the fact that the very legitimacy of its government is based to a large extent on its presence there. Nor will Israel withdraw. The United States, Israel's patron, will probably favor those groups antagonistic to Syria, but will refrain from a direct confrontation in which a beleaguered Syria with the support of a superpower might act indiscriminately against Israel. The United States and Israel apparently have time on their side.

Many facts support this conclusion. The Assad regime has been under severe attack at home since 1978. Witness the opposition by Sunnis to the increasing domination of Alawites; urban resentment against the favoritism shown to the rural areas and to the minority provinces of the Mediterranean coast and the Jabal ad-Druse; Sunni clergy opposition to "socialism," which seems somewhat ironic, given the policies of the Assad government and, lastly, enmity from displaced landowners. The opposition of the Sunnis in Syria increased after the minority-oriented "Levantinization" economic strategies of the Baath government were implemented with some vigor, a policy that evokes the policy of the Syrian Social Nationalist party (*al-Hizb al-Suri al-Oaumi al-Ijtima'i*) of pre-Baath times.

From 1978 to April, 1982, when Syria's Defense Companies (under the direction of Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of the President) and the Special Forces of Ali Haydar laid siege to Hama, Syria was in a virtual state

of civil war. The death toll in Hama alone was reportedly between 3,000 and 5,000. This internal unrest undoubtedly contributed to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June, 1982.

Today, Syria is unable to gain political legitimacy at home; it pursues policies contradictory to Baathist doctrine and spends enormous ideological and material resources in Lebanon. Thus many observers doubt Assad's ability to pursue his long-term goals and strategy in Lebanon and in the greater Syrian economic sphere. So far the regime has done better than most of its friends or enemies thought possible. Perhaps this is due in part to Arab disarray and the leaderless Arab world and, temporarily, to an overextended Israel.

But Israel will be able to recover quickly from its misguided policies in Lebanon with massive United States aid. By 1990, Israel will have ingested the West Bank and consolidated its power in southern Lebanon; the 60,000 Druse in Israel and the 600,000 Shiites in southern Lebanon will be cards that Israel will play in an attempt to draw the Shia and Druse of Lebanon into its sphere of influence. The United States and Europe will support Israel's strategy. Syria will have to be on guard against these formidable foes. ■

PALESTINIANS IN THE 1980'S

(Continued from page 20)

widespread fear among West Bankers that an irrevocable split in the PLO and a weakening of Arafat's authority will play into Syrian, Israeli and Jordanian hands, leaving West Bankers more vulnerable than ever. Moreover, West Bank political elites, traditionally divided and reluctant to take bold action, fear that they may soon be forced to make a choice concerning their future. On the other hand, many Palestinians are frustrated by Arafat's inability to act decisively and make the kinds of tactical concessions necessary to start a diplomatic process that might halt Israel's absorption of the West Bank.

Should the PLO formally split and should Arafat be seriously weakened or replaced, Palestinians will be more vulnerable and perhaps more amenable to the influence of others. Meanwhile, both the Jordanians and Israelis will continue their efforts to court West Bank elites. Indeed, the Israelis might decide to broaden their relations with traditional pro-Jordanian leaders. Islamic fundamentalists may also offer an increasingly attractive symbol for an alienated and embittered younger generation.

Even if the PLO collapsed or was fragmented, however, it is unlikely that any credible West Bankers would accept a Likud-style autonomy plan. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens's efforts to change the style of Israeli administrative policies will not persuade West Bankers to temper their opposition to the substance of Israeli settlement policies. Nonetheless,

should an Israeli government hold out the prospect of real autonomy to Palestinians and offer a role to Jordan acceptable to the Arab world, West Bankers would be tempted to participate, even if the PLO was still unable or unwilling to sanction such a process.

IN THE SHADOW OF DAMASCUS

The PLO's military defeat in Lebanon and its inability to formulate a political strategy to negotiate on the future of the West Bank have increased the Palestinian national movement's dependence on Arab regimes. Events of the last 18 months have sharpened the Palestinians' perennial dilemma: how to exploit the Arab states' political, military and financial power while formulating a policy relatively free from Arab tutelage.

Nowhere are the contradictions and tensions of this dilemma better illustrated than in the roller-coaster-like course of Syrian-Palestinian relations. Although since the 1960's Damascus has been one of the most consistent patrons of militant Palestinian nationalism, it has tried to ensure that Palestinian interests remain compatible, if not subordinate, to Syrian national concerns. Until the mid-1970's, Arafat and Fatah maneuvered in a multipolar Arab world, attempting to find middle ground amid the competing and conflicting interests and objectives of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976 and growing split with Egypt in the wake of the October, 1973, war created—at least for Arafat—a unipolar environment in which Damascus emerged as the preeminent Arab patron of Palestinian nationalism. Syrian forces in Lebanon, control over PLO supply lines, and influence with other Palestinian and Lebanese groups gave Assad formidable leverage. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's decision in 1977 to go to Jerusalem, the Iran-Iraq war in September, 1980, and deteriorating relations with Jordan further sharpened Syria's isolation and increased Assad's determination not to lose control over the Palestinian card. Arafat continued to exploit his relations with Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, but none of these states had the resources to compete with Syria's leverage over the PLO. In November, 1980, in the chill of the Jordanian-Syrian cold war, Assad pressured Arafat to boycott the twelfth Arab summit at Amman—the first such gathering the PLO had missed since it was created. As one observer noted, the choice for Arafat was simple: the Saudis were offering him *nuqud* (cash) to attend the meeting, and the Syrians were offering him *wujud* (existence) if he stayed away.

In the aftermath of the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut, Arafat apparently had an opportunity to reduce his dependence on Damascus and broaden the PLO's ties to Jordan and possibly Egypt. Damascus had provided limited support for the PLO during the Israeli invasion and had itself taken a beating from the Is-

raelis in the air. Thus it was badly discredited among Palestinians. Moreover, as diplomatic efforts intensified to get the PLO out of Beirut and make progress toward President Reagan's September 1 initiative, the Saudis, Jordanians and Egyptians—not the Syrians—played leading roles. Finally, the withdrawal of PLO forces from Beirut and the relocation of Arafat's headquarters to Tunis seemed to give him additional maneuvering room vis-à-vis Damascus. The Palestinian National Council resolutions in February, while intentionally ambiguous, appeared to give Arafat an opportunity to explore the possibilities of cutting a deal with Jordan's Hussein.

Arafat's opportunities, however, were short-lived. The collapse of the Arafat-Hussein negotiations meant that the Palestinians would remain closely tied to Damascus. Syria offered political and military support to those elements within Fatah that were opposed to Arafat's diplomatic maneuvers. Moreover, as long as the "armed struggle" continued to play such a vital role in Palestinian ideology and tactics, Syria would remain an indispensable patron of militant Palestinian nationalism. Syrian control of the Bekaa Valley gave Assad formidable leverage over Fatah fighters. Even Arafat's colleagues in Fatah and groups like the PFLP and DFLP, long suspicious of Assad's motives, would not consider a break with the PLO's most powerful Arab patron. Khalid al-Fahum, PNC speaker, recently described the Syrian-PLO relationship, as a "Catholic marriage which can withstand differences but [can] never contemplate divorce."⁹

The broad outlines of Syria's Palestinian strategy seem clear. Assad is trying to ensure that the Palestinian movement initiates no major military or political decisions that contradict Syrian interests. Regulating the PLO's behavior in Lebanon becomes a key asset in the event Assad wants to step up the military pressure against the Gemayel government or eventually negotiate a Syrian withdrawal. On larger Arab-Israeli issues, control over the Palestinian card gives Damascus an effective veto to block a West Bank settlement and useful leverage with the Egyptians, Jordanians and Saudis.

Assad's attitude toward Arafat is less clear. The two men doubtless detest one another, and reports that Arafat is meeting with Muslim Brotherhood elements in Tripoli only fuel Syrian fears. Nonetheless, Assad may continue to tolerate Arafat's role as PLO chairman, provided Arafat does not try to undermine or contravene Syrian interests. And Arafat may have little choice but reconciliation. The price remains to be seen.

THE ISRAELI CHALLENGE

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon paradoxically cre-

ated new opportunities and resources for the PLO in its political and military struggle against Israel. The war had initially failed to break the PLO; instead, the war created widespread sympathy for the Palestinian cause and isolated Israel, and forced the Reagan administration to become actively involved in the Palestinian problem. The Israeli siege of Beirut and the Phalangist massacres at Sabra and Shatila turned international opinion decisively against the Menachem Begin government in Israel, which was widely accused of launching a war for political goals that had little to do with Israel's national security.

Although Palestinians criticized President Reagan's plan for its failure to propose an independent Palestinian state or to allow PLO representation in negotiations, Arafat doubtless viewed it as a positive step—the first stage in a complex diplomatic game that could have positive results. Few within Fatah and on the West Bank believed the United States was willing to force Israel out of the occupied territories, but they also knew that American support was essential to any negotiated settlement, the sine qua non for achieving any Palestinian territorial objectives. In a characteristic flurry of calculated ambiguities, Arafat tried to avoid direct rejection of the Reagan initiative, hoping that the United States would later amend the plan to include the concept of self-determination.

If the war initially created political opportunities for the PLO, it also seemed to open new dimensions in the Palestinian armed struggle. Arafat's claim that Palestinian fighters had resisted the mighty Israeli army longer than any other Arab force carried considerable credibility in the "Arab street," particularly in view of the lack of support of the Arab regimes. The invasion had decisively crushed the PLO's infrastructure in southern Lebanon and West Beirut and eliminated the threat to Israel's northern towns and settlements. But the war also led to Israel's prolonged occupation of large areas of Lebanon and enhanced Israeli vulnerability.

Palestinian political and military gains, however, seemed short-lived. Indeed, more than 18 months after the Israeli invasion, the PLO is weaker and less able to deal with Israel than ever. The political momentum the PLO had acquired in the wake of the invasion has been derailed. Arafat was unable to convert international support into concrete political gains. And Israel's redeployment to the Awali River, the Fatah mutiny, and Assad's efforts to control PLO fighters have combined to defuse and distract the Palestinian guerrilla war against Israel. Any concerted effort to make the costs of Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon too high for Israel to bear will likely be led by Lebanese rather than Palestinian fighters.

W(H)ITHER THE PLO?

The fact that the PLO has survived the events of

⁹Interview with Khalid al-Fahum, Kuwait News Agency, September 17, 1983; *FBIS*, Middle East and Africa, September 21, 1983, p. A1.

the past 18 months, kept its institutions intact, and retained the support of a majority of its constituents is a testament to the durability of the Palestinian national movement.

However, this cannot soften the harsh realities now confronting the PLO, particularly Arafat and Fatah. The past year and a half have accelerated the problems of decentralization and dependency that have challenged the Palestinian national movement since its inception. The loss of Lebanon, the aging of the traditional leadership and the perceived bankruptcy of Arafat's political strategy have undermined efforts to centralize decision making and have led to a sense of paralysis and stagnation. Unless a way can be found to break free of the bonds of consensus politics and counter Damascus, Arafat may simply be bypassed as the PLO falls more deeply into the Syrian orbit.

The PLO has faced challenges before. But never has the Palestinian leadership seemed so paralyzed. Arafat seems trapped between the PLO's past and its future. On one hand, there is its past—characterized by its Lebanese sojourn, its maximal demands, its armed struggle, and its close ties with Syria. On the other hand, there is its future—marked by ties to the West Bank, pragmatic diplomacy, and a closer relationship with Jordan.

In trying to straddle the past and future, Arafat will resort to the traditional Palestinian and inter-Arab balancing act. He will try to broaden his ties to Jordan's Hussein and threaten to play the Jordanian card to counter Syrian pressure; yet he will avoid an open break with Damascus. And Arafat will play the revolutionary in an effort to outflank the rebels in Fatah but he will not reject diplomatic strategy. All this will be directed at buying time.

In the end, however, the delay and vacillation that have served Arafat so well may no longer work to his advantage. Arafat's success will depend largely on Syrian intentions. If Arafat concludes that Damascus is determined to replace him as PLO leader and remake the organization, he may have to accept an open break with the Syrians, leave Lebanon, and commit the PLO to the Jordanian option.

It is also possible, however, that the diplomatic alternative will no longer be available. Israel's de facto annexation of the West Bank, Arafat's own intransigence, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon have gone a long way to discredit and undermine prospects for a compromise solution. The rebellion in the Fatah ranks is not only a challenge to Arafat's style of leadership but to the substance of the PLO's diplomatic approach.

Hard-liners in Fatah argue that time is on the PLO's side and that compromise must be avoided at all costs. Supported by many within the DFLP and PFLP, they believe that the key to liberating Palestine is not conventional military or political tactics. As they see it, the

road to Palestine lies through Riyadh, Amman and Cairo—mobilizing the combined military, political and financial resources of the Arab world for a long-term struggle against Israel. This may be an unrealistic and futuristic strategy, but it will be sustained by the realities of a permanent Palestinian diaspora, the instability of key Arab regimes, and the volatility of an unresolved Palestinian problem. In the end, a younger generation of Palestinians may once again take Shukairy's words seriously. ■

SAUDI ARABIAN OIL POLICIES

(Continued from page 32)

living, which in turn would threaten the survival of the regime. Failure to meet its international obligations would threaten the kingdom's survival as a nation, because its enemies are currently "bought off" by huge subsidies. This is far too pessimistic an assessment, because the Saudi society and economy are strong and resilient.

Currently, Saudi Arabia faces two output constraints that limit its freedom of action. It must produce at least 4.7 mbd to generate enough associated gas to meet peak demand of desalination plants, electric power generating stations and the newly established petrochemical industry.⁶ As long as output is at the OPEC quota level there should be no problem in meeting this lower constraint. Assuming that non-oil revenues continue at the current levels, requirements of the third development plan (1980–1985) can apparently be met with an output of about 6 mbd at \$29 a barrel. The current quota is clearly insufficient to meet the needs of the development plan; but, if world economic conditions continue to improve, Saudi output should rise above 6 mbd, unbinding the second constraint.

The budget year 1983–1984 (April to April) is the fourth year of the third development plan. King Fahd has approved a budget calling for expenditures of \$74.4 billion and estimated revenues of \$65.2 billion, yielding a projected deficit of \$10.2 billion. The revenue estimate appears to be reasonable. An output of 5 mbd would yield about \$53 billion with the remainder coming from Hadj, customs receipts, investment income and other non-oil revenue sources. Alternative projections made by non-Saudi sources suggest a maximum deficit of about \$25 billion, but these are based on extreme assumptions that are unlikely to materialize. Regardless of the final deficit, King Fahd has said that the shortfall will be made up from reserves, which have been estimated at between \$165 billion and \$190 billion. Furthermore, since 1980 the value of the United States dollar has risen about 20 percent against nearly all major currencies. Since the oil producers are paid in dollars, their purchasing power in Germany, France and Japan has increased, offsetting to some

⁶*Oil and Gas Journal*, March 23, 1983, p. 64.

extent the lower price of oil. Thus, it is unlikely that the current budget deficit will force Saudi Arabia to abandon its role as OPEC's swing producer in the foreseeable future.

What about the longer run? Will a slowdown in oil revenues destabilize the kingdom by aggravating internal and external problems? Since 1978, some observers have asserted that Saudi Arabia's domestic and international survival can only be assured with oil revenues larger than those generated by 6.5 mbd output. There is no doubt that production below 6.5 mbd over several years would force a reduction in the pace of economic development. This should have relatively little negative effect in the next several years and may even carry important benefits. First, the biggest and most expensive capital projects—roads, airports, water desalination plants—have almost been completed. The newly established petrochemical industries are coming on stream. They are being integrated in world markets and should earn enough profits to provide for their own expansion. Second, the social infrastructure is nearing completion. During the first and second five-year economic development plans (1970 to 1980), 11,000 schools were built; enrollment at all levels of education rose from 545,000 to 1.5 million persons; and facilities operated by the Ministry of Health increased substantially. These achievements will lower the revenue requirements over the next several years.

The rapid pace of development has created several domestic problems. There is no doubt that the average citizen has benefited from the development. Employment opportunities have increased and real wages have risen, subsidies have kept food prices low, social services have been increased, and free medical care, free education and expanded social services have raised the standard of living. But income distribution has deteriorated. As is the case in all countries at Saudi Arabia's stage of development, gaps in income distribution have appeared between various social groups and regions. This resulted in part from the growth pole development strategy of the second development plan that called for the creation of two huge petrochemical complexes in sparsely settled regions, which have yet to produce major employment opportunities for Saudis. This strategy neglected the more highly populated agricultural areas such as the Asir. Recent emphasis on agricultural development, however, should reduce this difference.

The most important threat to the long-term survival of Saudi society is the presence of about two million foreign workers. This foreign presence raises several problems: first, to the extent that Arab immigrants come from a more radical background they could serve as a catalyst for possible opposition to the current regime. This danger has been reduced to some extent by the replacement of Yemeni and Palestinian workers with Asian labor, particularly Pakistani and Korean,

whose inability to speak Arabic has reduced contact with the Saudi population. Second, the foreign workers, Arab or non-Arab, have a different, usually more liberal life-style. Conservative elements among the ulema (religious teachers) fear that their example may lead to desertion of "the old ways."

Third, because of the availability of foreign skilled and unskilled labor Saudi labor has not been integrated into the economic structure. For a variety of economic and social reasons Saudi workers have been slow to move into many trades and occupations opened up in the newly developed industries. The government has contributed to the problem by creating large numbers of low productivity public sector jobs, which has led to some underemployment of the Saudi labor force. This cannot continue. Expatriate labor is expensive; it may cost as much as one-third to one-half extra to fill a job with a foreign worker. Furthermore, foreign labor will widen the developing gaps in income distribution. Many foreign workers hold skilled jobs that offer chances for advancement and higher pay. To the extent that Saudi workers do not hold such jobs, their future will be tied to low productivity, with low-paying jobs depriving them of higher income.

A more measured pace of development in the next five to ten years will help to resolve these potentially destabilizing conditions. A reduction in the foreign labor force, which has already begun, will reduce the demonstration effect of their different life-styles and reduce the conservatives' anxiety about the pernicious influence of foreigners. Many of these workers will have to be replaced by Saudis, lowering costs as well as integrating Saudi labor into the modern industrialized sector. Finally, a more measured pace should also disarm those domestic critics who argue that continued high levels of production will deplete oil reserves too quickly, depriving future generations of their benefits.

Any analyst projecting the effect of the current state of affairs on Saudi Arabia cannot ignore events in the Middle East generally. Given conditions in Lebanon and the war between Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia faces considerable danger. But barring attacks by Iran on the production and shipment of Saudi oil, there is substantial evidence that the heirs of King Abdul Azziz have created a viable society that can defend itself and survive the current threats. ■

ISRAEL: A TIME OF RETRENCHMENT

(Continued from page 16)

community from which the Likud drew the bulk of its votes. With the support of the "Old Guard," Shamir defeated Levy in the vote over the succession to Begin, but there was doubt about whether Begin's personal popularity among Sephardi voters could be transferred to Shamir.

Moreover, the bargaining power of small parties in

a closely balanced Knesset led Shamir to make concessions that could undermine his own government. To the ultra-orthodox Agudat Yisrael, for example, Shamir was forced to make definitive commitments on legislation regarding non-orthodox conversions and archaeological digs in sites thought to contain ancient cemeteries—both touchy subjects on which Begin had long managed to avoid a final showdown. Israeli governments have fallen over lesser issues.

But the economic situation was even more of an immediate threat. As Shamir came to power, the government faced an emergency: the combination of foreign debts and continuing deficits was leading to a drying up of the credit sources necessary to keep the economic system operating. The government took a number of drastic measures that had long been considered economically essential but politically suicidal: the Israeli shekel was devalued by 23 percent in order to improve terms of trade; large cuts were planned in government spending; and subsidies on basic items of consumption were slashed. This created immediate difficulties within the coalition, for while such measures had long been urged by the classical free-market theorists of the Liberal party (part of Likud), they were opposed by representatives of lower-income groups (especially Sephardim) who represented the Likud's most important base of support.

Given the country's problems, there were also demands for a government of national unity (that is, a Likud-Labor coalition) among Shamir's own backers. Shamir dealt with these demands by making the gesture of negotiating with Labor leaders, but given basic differences over such issues as West Bank settlements, there was little risk of success in the endeavor.

FAVORING FACTORS

Working in the new Prime Minister's favor was the fact that the smaller parties in the coalition did not want immediate elections and that the opposition was also in some disarray. The rivalry between Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin continued to dominate politics within the Labor party and weary an electorate long since tired of the feud, and the appearance of former President Yitzhak Navon as a possible third candidate for leadership had not basically transformed the picture. Navon enjoyed personal popularity and, as a Sephardi, could potentially restore the Labor party's severed links to that community, but Navon lacked a firm base of support within the party and it was not clear that he could succeed in reunifying it.

In this confused and highly fluid situation, sometime within the next two years a fateful choice of direction will be made. The very fluidity and delicacy of the current balance make any effort to predict that choice foolhardy. When made, however, it may settle the debate that has been waged among Zionists since the 1930's, between a cohesive but compact Jewish

state, on one hand, or a more extensive homeland that sacrifices homogeneity in the name of territorial integrity.

The choice will be very significant for other Middle East parties, but it will also be influenced, to a great degree, by their behavior and actions in the interim. As Egypt's President Sadat demonstrated, Arab governments have the capacity to rewrite the terms of Israeli politics. Whether and how they will choose to exercise this capacity is perhaps the most fateful uncertainty in the entire picture. ■

JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

(Continued from page 24)

Reagan Plan in July and August, 1982, conversations between King Hussein and former Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotis led Washington to believe that if it came forward with an initiative placing Jordan at the center of policy, Amman would respond positively.¹⁴ But unfortunately, the Fez Summit of September 6–8 did not endorse the Reagan Plan or United States policy as the State Department had believed it would, but rather hewed to the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" and to a hardened version of the Fahd Plan, neither of which was compatible with United States policy. As a result, Israeli rejection of the Reagan Plan, which was immediate, could not be softened by diplomatic concessions to a more reasonable Arab position that did not exist.

Hussein's first major contribution to the consequent diplomatic effort took the form of an interview he gave to the BBC on September 14. Hussein suggested reviving the Reagan Plan in the aftermath of the setback of the Fez Summit, advancing by way of a preemptive diplomatic counterpoint a distinctively Jordanian interpretation of the consensus reached at Fez, and encouraging moderate Palestinians in the PLO and on the West Bank to see their fates as best bound up with Jordan.

The King also repeated, more boldly at any time since Camp David, the essence of his March, 1972, proposal for a United Arab Kingdom, or a confederation between a Palestinian West Bank and Jordan. To this he added, for the first time, that the PLO was "a transition" and that eventually "the term PLO will cease to exist and Palestinians will present themselves to the world in a different way." Moreover, the King declared the inevitability of explicit diplomatic recognition of Israel in the context of peace. Asked about the Israeli Labor party's positive response to the Reagan Plan, Hussein said that he was "encouraged by any sign that suggests people in Israel are concerned as far as the future goes."

¹⁴See in particular Marvine Howe, "A Fresh Initiative for Palestinians Urged by Hussein," *The New York Times*, August 30, 1982.

Since he also noted that serious negotiations with Israel were impossible "as Israel stands now," Hussein in effect clearly stated the difference between Labor and Likud, something he had always understood but was reluctant to voice in public. Finally, when asked whether there was any room for compromise between the Reagan Plan, which explicitly precluded an independent Palestinian state, and the Fez Plan, which explicitly insisted on one, Hussein said that Fez represented "the minimal and maximal Arab position," suggesting that he would rather see the Fez Plan move toward the Reagan Plan than the other way around.

A week later, Hussein said publicly that the time had come to begin discussions between Jordan and the PLO on a possible federation between the West Bank and Jordan. The King did not make this statement until Arafat's agreement to commence talks with Jordan had already been secured.

The series of Arafat-Hussein negotiations had the predictable effect of arousing Syrian ire, worsening the Fatah-Syrian cold war and, as a consequence, exposing the PLO to intense centrifugal pressures. On April 10, Jordan announced that the talks had failed, and that there was nothing more that it could do.

The Arafat-Hussein agreement was overturned by Syrian threats, internal PLO opposition, and the mischievous meddling of both the Saudi and Moroccan governments. According to Hussein, the United States was also to blame for failing to see to its own credibility by stopping Israel's West Bank settlement policy and getting Israeli and Syrian forces out of Lebanon.¹⁵ From the United States perspective, however, blame rested on the Arabs, who had failed to put their own house in order. More to the point, the prematurity of the Reagan Plan was responsible for keeping the diplomatic agenda stalled in Beirut, and this is what precluded both an Arab consensus on the Reagan Plan and effective United States pressure on Israel.

Syria demonstrated its mastery over the PLO's residual military capabilities in August and September in Lebanon's mini-civil war over the Shuf Mountains. Arafat loyalists were prepared for a "last stand"; there was nowhere left to go, and none of them imagined that salvation might lie in calling upon the mercies of the Arab states. On October 9, from his refuge in Tripoli, Lebanon, Arafat called "for resumption of the dialogue with Jordan at all levels. We have to transcend all misunderstandings and be united—Palestinians and Jordanians."¹⁶

As of this writing, Arafat is neither inclined nor able to resist the King as he did in April. Judging from the overwhelming support for the Reagan Plan on the West Bank and the overwhelming Palestinian support

for Arafat, genuine Palestinian political moderation, Arafat's personal prestige, and Hashemite interests may converge under Jordanian aegis. If Jordan can succeed in forging a political majority of Palestinians from among the Palestinian citizens of the East Bank, the notable moderates of the West Bank, and Arafat's rump of Fatah—and retain ultimate control over the coalition—then Jordan may lead Palestinian interests into a negotiation with Israel that has at least a chance to succeed. Despite the dangers posed by Syrian opposition, Hussein might try. He no doubt understands the lesson that Arafat has been learning since May: that no matter what one does, there are no guarantees against Syria's regional imperialism. Besides, for Jordan there is no other way to have peace with Israel, peace with the Palestinians, the return of at least part of the West Bank, and economic and security assistance from the United States all at the same time. Even if negotiations do not succeed, the stability of the Hashemite monarchy in the East Bank will almost certainly be strengthened by any attempt at negotiation that fosters Palestinian-Jordanian cooperation and coordination. ■

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 4)

putting the Lebanese adventure behind them, and the British and Italians will follow suit. To undertake this withdrawal through a four-power coordination mechanism would defuse its impact and lower the excessively high American profile, but it would not change the outcome. That it will be damaging to the United States standing in the Middle East is probable. How much damage will result depends on the speed and skill of American diplomacy, which has not been notably skillful of late.

The approaching presidential elections in the United States will also complicate diplomacy. The United States desire for initiatives in the Middle East will probably exhaust itself in the effort to withdraw from the wreckage of its Lebanese adventure and in its watchful worry over the security of the Persian Gulf. If there is to be a new peace effort, it will have to wait until 1985.

The Reagan administration's insistence on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is at best an expression of political-diplomatic necessity, not necessarily a statement of an obtainable result. It would be far worse if the administration were to believe what it says; that would mean that the administration does not understand either the consequences of its actions and words or the contradictions in its own thinking.

The problem faced by the Reagan administration is one of perception as well as action. If it perceives every Syrian action as Soviet-inspired, then Lebanon becomes part of the worldwide East-West struggle and

¹⁵For details, see the three articles by Karen Elliott House in the *Wall Street Journal*, April 14, 15 and 20, 1983.

¹⁶Thomas L. Friedman, "Arafat Moves to Play His Jordan Card," *The New York Times*, October 10, 1983.

the United States must use all means at its disposal to stop further Soviet advance, including the "Israeli card," which would then be a "strategic asset."

On the other hand, if Syria's actions are primarily motivated by a regional quest for power aided but not directed by the Soviet Union, then Syria's probable domination of all or most of Lebanon is not a matter of vital United States concern, but rather demonstrates that the United States must take Syria more seriously in its Middle East strategy. That would mean an attempt to see whether Hafez Assad might rather have more than a Soviet option. If this were the United States view, then Syria's domination of Lebanon need not constitute an American defeat, but rather a diplomatic challenge. American diplomats might then bargain for a mix in which Syria might settle for less than total domination in order to gain greater freedom of maneuver toward the Soviet Union, which would nonetheless remain Syria's main supporter.

Unfortunately, neither the perception of the conflict as a Soviet-inspired struggle nor the view that Syria is primarily trying to expand its regional influence is likely to be completely accurate. In either case, if the United States favors one or the other viewpoint, that action alone may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. ■

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

(Continued from page 12)

which is usually far less all-embracing than that term implies. Since World War II, leaders in this world have portrayed themselves as occupying the vanguard of a struggle against imperialism and Zionism and the social injustice that imperialist exploitation generates. In practice, they have been far more pragmatic than their rhetoric suggests and, in the eyes of most people, they have failed to achieve their stated goals.

Their preference for the Soviet Union as an ally is far less a manifestation of ideological compatibility than of practical necessity. American policy appears to them to be unalterably hostile, leaving them therefore with no real alternative. In several instances, most notably in the case of Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq in Iran and Prime Minister Suleiman Nabulsi in Jordan, nationalist leaders have been the victims of coups in which the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was a major participant. The greatest historic leader of this type was Egypt's Nasser; when his successor, Anwar Sadat, left this group and moved toward conservatism, secular nationalism in the Arab world suffered a terrible defeat.

The third tendency is truly revolutionary as measured in terms of the alteration of the governing elite, economic policy, social class structure and political culture generally. This is the tendency toward radical religious literalist leadership that has seen full expression only in Iran. The attraction of this movement is the

result of many factors. But most important is the exceedingly rapid growth in the size and composition of the population that is predisposed to be politically active. This newly awakened population mass tends to look to religious leaders as the only political elite element that truly understands their aspirations and grievances. The movement is a true manifestation of class conflict and tends to incorporate not only a rejection of secular nationalist and largely middle class leaders but a rejection because they have surrendered to Western cultural domination. The failure of the secular nationalists in their struggle with imperialism and its Israeli manifestation is to this element proof of the secular nationalists' enervation. This movement rejects any alliance with either the United States or the Soviet Union, which are seen as ultimate collaborators in maintaining imperial domination. It shares with the secular nationalists the view of conservative regimes, such as those of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, as outright agents of the imperial conspiracy.

Before the Iranian revolution was successful, Hussein was making diplomatic moves that appeared to be taking him from the secular nationalist group and toward the conservative regimes of the area. This may well have been and probably was simply a tactical move on Hussein's part, the ultimate objective of which was to achieve leadership of secular Arab nationalism. Iraq, after all, had long portrayed itself as the most pure of secular nationalist regimes in its hostility toward imperialism and Zionism. For Hussein to move closer to regimes like Saudi Arabia and Jordan entailed great risks. Arabs wondered if he was not following the Sadat lead and deserting the Arab cause. Khomeini and his followers were sure he had deserted. Conservative Arabs welcomed the movement in large part because of the threat they saw from radical religious movements, but they remained apprehensive about Hussein's ultimate objectives.

Attitudes hardened as the form of the Islamic Republican government in Iran crystallized. It constituted a major threat to both conservative and secular nationalist leaders. But the immediacy of the threat was far more apparent to Hussein and his new found conservative allies than it was to Hussein's secular nationalist rivals. Thus, as the Iraq-Iran conflict moved toward open warfare, Arab opponents of Saddam Hussein consolidated their friendly relations with Iran. But it was ultimately an uneasy alliance. Khomeini had purged Iranian secular nationalists from Iranian political and, indeed, social life. And they differed sharply on the virtues of an alliance with the Soviet Union and in their judgment of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Iran, for its part, eased the situation by making a number of what appear to be surprisingly pragmatic decisions for so doctrinaire a regime. For example, Iran sided strongly with Syrian President Hafez Assad

in his struggle with the fundamentalist Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. The Iranian foreign minister chastised the Brotherhood for having weakened the Syrian government at a moment of terrible crisis in its conflict with Israel and its imperial allies. This stand left Iran open to the charge that it favored Assad because of his membership in the Alawi sect in Syria, which regards itself as part of the Shia Islamic world.

The charge is a costly one for Iran. Khomeini is adamant in his insistence that his movement is Islamic, not simply Shia. But there are other pragmatic manifestations in Iran's policy. Friendly relations are maintained with Turkey and Pakistan even though both are regarded as near surrogates of the United States. And Iran has apparently purchased some arms and spare parts from the Israelis, whom it claims to oppose with such totality.

The Iranian regime takes a fundamentally different sociopolitical approach to that of either the conservatives or the nationalists. Its pragmatic and parochial tendencies are significant and should be taken seriously. But the revolutionary potential of the movement is far from played out. There are indications that with the passing of Khomeini the Iranian regime will evolve in a direction of increasing Iranian nationalism, less doctrinaire views of the economy and culture and less interest in fomenting revolution abroad. But this change is unlikely to come rapidly and the impact of Iran's policy is likely to be strongly revolutionary in the short run. The appearance of a like-minded regime in Iraq would quickly alter the power equation of the area. It would be an immediate threat to conservative Arabs and to Israel. But it could soon also threaten the secular nationalist leaders of Syria and the PLO.

For American policy, which is devoted to the three-fold objectives of deterring perceived Soviet expansion, defending Israeli sovereignty, and maintaining the flow of oil to the world economy, the Iran-Iraq picture is a crazy quilt. What attitude should American policy take toward regimes representing these three tendencies? The answers appear more the consequence of inertia than strategic-tactical planning. United States attempts to balance its support for Israel with its perceived need for an alliance with anti-Soviet conservative Arab regimes anger both Israel and Arab allies and may be weakening the latter. All objectives seem to converge in a policy of opposing a Syria allied to the Soviet Union, hostile to Israel and assertive of Arab nationalist demands. But should this policy destabilize Assad and result in the formation of a Muslim Brotherhood government in Syria, it could quickly lead to the elimination of Washington's closest Arab friends. In this event, Washington would be compelled to address seriously the question of how it should deal with radical Islam as a political force.

Soviet policy appears, if anything, even more confused. The Soviet Union is actively fighting radical Is-

lamic forces in Afghanistan. It has been alternately solicitous of and angry with the radical Islamic regime in Iran, which has expelled many Soviet diplomats and arrested the leadership of the pro-Soviet Tudeh party. It largely ignores radical Islam in the Arab states, whether it is a force destabilizing friendly or unfriendly regimes. Soviet leaders are willing to sell arms to both Iran and Iraq while at the same time they lament the war as serving only American and Israeli interests. As important as the area must be to the Soviet Union, there have been no serious Soviet diplomatic initiatives in any direction. Soviet policy, too, appears to be best explained by the inertia thesis.

As a consequence of the Iraq-Iran war, the dynamics of events in the Middle East have a highly disruptive potential. But they are beyond the control and, really, the understanding of either superpower. ■

PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON

(Continued from page 8)

35,000 loyal troops finally reappeared; and the United States Marines (along with French, Italian, and British troops) successfully shielded the still frail regime in Beirut from the combination of Muslim/Druse/leftist forces. The reversion of Lebanon to the darkest days of pre-June, 1982, has so far been forestalled.

Unfortunately, the Lebanon of late 1983 still suffers from the plethora of problems that makes its survival anything but certain. At present, Lebanon faces three main challenges. The first is how to effect the withdrawal of foreign occupation troops that have made a mockery of Lebanese sovereignty. This is a problem that no Lebanese government can solve on its own. Clearly, the Lebanese army cannot be expected to handle the Syrians or the Israelis. Effective international pressure might succeed in compelling foreign forces to leave Lebanon, but a number of factors dim this prospect for the foreseeable future.

For one, Syria's physical presence in Lebanon increases its political leverage in the country and enables Damascus to press claims to Lebanese territory. Occupation also enhances Syria's influence over the Palestinians and buttresses its position in inter-Arab disputes. As for the Israelis, they have little to gain by extending their stay in Lebanon. But unless heavy United States pressure—with dubious results—is exerted on it, the Jewish state will not withdraw its forces before it can set up a permanent "security zone" in south Lebanon, where it would prefer to keep the political, military, and economic reins in its own hands. This objective, however, might take many years. Similarly, the Palestinians have nothing to gain and everything to lose if they withdraw from Lebanon. After all, the dispersal of the PLO forces to distant Arab countries far from Israeli borders has been their basic night-

mare for 18 months. Last, contrary to its public assertions, even the Gemayel government may not be entirely unhappy with the current situation. It recognizes only too well that if foreign troops are forced to withdraw swiftly, factional warlords, not the weak Lebanese army, would take over.

The second basic obstacle to Lebanese sovereignty and domestic tranquility is the continued existence of regional warlords and their local militias. In addition to the regular Syrian and Israeli forces, there are literally thousands of well-armed militias roaming through the country; and a dozen or more factional warlords still dominate their fiefdoms.

What explains the preponderance of these centrifugal forces? To be sure, the destruction of most political, military, and administrative organs of the Lebanese state during the years of civil strife has obviously strengthened the various warlords. Yet it must be recognized that these forces are not a novel phenomenon. Political power in Lebanon has always rested with large landowning clans and families whose typical representatives are today's warlords. Despite blows dealt to feudal relations, especially in the 1960's, the country's confessional social structure provides ample opportunity for these leaders to strengthen their positions by taking power in all government organs. These men also perpetuate the traditional involvement of foreign powers in Lebanon's political life; they generally cooperate with anybody, Lebanese or not, to the extent necessary to preserve or enhance their power in their fiefdoms. At the same time, the warlords derive much vitality from the fact that their sectarian followers generally tend to support them irrespective of their political stands. In return, these leaders (not the government) provide security and the basic services.

As for the more "modernized" militia organizations, like the Sunni Murabitun or the Shia Amal, they no longer derive power from the family ties of their leaders but from their ability to mobilize street fighters on short notice. Spanning the political and confessional spectrum, these paramilitary groups are led by younger and more radicalized men, who have emerged during the civil strife of the recent years by challenging the traditional leaders. However, like these men, they too look to foreign sources for financial and political support. In this process, they tend to reinforce the traditional involvement of outside powers in internal Lebanese affairs.

Here again, the Lebanese government is nearly powerless to act. As the bloody Shuf conflict last September demonstrated, the Gemayel administration needs a much stronger military muscle to defeat and disarm all the various factional militias and warlords and end the lawlessness. More important, the present government in Beirut is still far from being recognized as the repository of "national" legitimacy. In a country where territorial nationalism remains an esoteric concept and where national appeal cannot generate a

strong popular willingness to make the sacrifices necessary for attaining independence and sovereignty, little can be expected from a government. In sum, the various centrifugal forces in Lebanon are direct vestiges of that country's historical experience.

Finally, there is the more serious challenge of how to reknit a torn society. It has been argued that the reconstruction of Lebanon's military and political organs is the key to that country's recovery. This may be true, inasmuch as efforts concentrate on extending the central government's rule beyond the rubble-strewn suburbs of Beirut. But Lebanon's recovery requires far more than rebuilding workable state structures or hammering out a new and a more viable national pact. First, there is a Lebanese identity, but it is not as significant as a Maronite, Druse, Shia, Sunni or Armenian identity. This reality enormously complicates the task of arriving at a national consensus.

Perhaps equally important is the realization that in a decade of civil strife, Lebanon has suffered not only the extreme fragmentation of its political order, but the dissolution of its society. Indeed, as a keen Lebanese observer, Samir Khalaf, has noted, the most basic norms of social interaction that tie a society together—personal confidence, decency, loyalty, and compassion—have been largely and perhaps fatally eroded. As Lebanon's modern history demonstrates, self-centered factional groups can somehow be forced to continue living together, and pacts, contracts, or agreements can create new state organs. But how can human beings reconstruct a society?

To predict Lebanon's future would be a feckless exercise, but one might speculate on some possibilities. First, Lebanon can be partitioned along existing confessional lines and turned into two or more separate but unviable ministates. This model would have serious political implications for the region. It would mean the formal acceptance of sectarianism as a basis for state structures in the Arab world. And this could be carried in time to every Arab state and thus destroy the present state system in the region. At present, this is an unlikely outcome.

The formal dismemberment of Lebanon and its eventual annexation by Syria and Israel is another possibility, although this is not the stated policy of Lebanon's neighbors. Far from reducing tensions, this option would sharpen tensions between Syria and Israel by pitting their forces against each other in a more dangerous position. This option would further complicate superpower relations in the region and defeat the United States peace efforts in the Middle East.

Last, a federal Lebanon can be pieced together, in a country where a central government and an army could eventually reemerge. But Lebanon would still be divided into a multiplicity of territorially based confessional groups. The factions might pay lip service

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of November, 1983, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arms Control

Nov. 14—U.S. chief negotiator Paul H. Nitze presents a modified U.S. proposal for limiting medium-range missiles to Soviet negotiators in Geneva; the U.S. would limit its deployment to less than 420 nuclear warheads if the Soviet Union would cut its medium-range missiles to no more than 420 warheads.

In Moscow, the government press agency Tass calls the U.S. offer "patently unacceptable."

Nov. 18—The U.S. State Department reports that the U.S. has turned down an informal offer by the Soviet Union to reduce by half its SS-20 missile force aimed at West Europe if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) drops its plan to deploy 572 new U.S. missiles.

Nov. 23—Tass announces that the Soviet Union is discontinuing "the present round of talks" on limiting medium-range missiles because the U.S. is beginning to deploy new missiles in Europe today.

Soviet negotiators walk out of the INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) talks in Geneva.

Nov. 24—In a written statement, Soviet President Yuri Andropov says that the Soviet Union will deploy additional seaborne nuclear missiles against the U.S. and will increase the number of SS-20 missiles aimed at West Europe; he says that "the Soviet Union considers its further participation in these talks [the Geneva negotiations on limiting medium-range nuclear missiles] impossible."

U.S. President Ronald Reagan expresses dismay at the Soviet action.

Nov. 29—In Geneva, U.S. and Soviet negotiators resume talks on intercontinental missiles, the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) negotiations.

Central American Defense Council (CONDECA)

Nov. 10—*The New York Times* reports that the newly reconstituted CONDECA—El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and Honduras—is studying the "legal instruments" that would allow CONDECA to invade Nicaragua and "pacify" it.

Commonwealth Nations Conference

Nov. 23—Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi opens the 44-nation Commonwealth conference in New Delhi.

Nov. 29—The conference ends; a communiqué calls for "reconstruction, not recrimination" in Grenada.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

(See *Brazil; U.S., Legislation*)

Iran-Iraq War

(See also *France*)

Nov. 21—Iraq state radio reports that 7 ships were destroyed by Iraqi planes near Kharg Island, Iran's main oil terminal.

Nov. 25—The commander of Iraq's naval and coastal defenses warns all ships to stay out of the "war zone"

around Kharg Island at the northern end of the Persian Gulf.

Nov. 27—Iran's official press agency reports that "revolutionaries" detonated a truck bomb at Iraq's intelligence headquarters in Baghdad today, killing more than 100 Iraqi officials.

Lebanon Crisis

(See also *Intl, Palestinian Crisis; Syria; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 3—Factional leaders meeting in Geneva agree not to ratify or abrogate the May 17 Israeli-Lebanese withdrawal agreement.

Nov. 4—A suicide bomber blows up the Israeli headquarters for southern Lebanon in Tyre; at least 39 people are killed and 39 are wounded.

Israeli jets retaliate for the attack, bombing suspected Palestinian targets in the Bekaa Valley; at least 60 people are killed.

Nov. 9—Officials at the national reconciliation talks in Geneva say that a constitutional formula has been worked out; the new constitution would use the principle of parity to decide on the representation of Christians and Muslims in Parliament.

Nov. 10—A Syrian military spokesman says that Syrian anti-aircraft batteries in Lebanon opened fire on a U.S. reconnaissance plane.

Nov. 11—The national reconciliation talks adjourn.

Nov. 16—Israeli jets bomb a training base thought to belong to Shiite Muslims, who are suspected of bombing the U.S. Marine and French positions in Beirut last month; 30 people are reported killed.

Nov. 17—French warplanes attack suspected Shiite Muslim positions in the Baalbek area.

U.S. officials say that no decision has been made to retaliate for the bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut; there are 40 naval ships off Lebanon, including 3 aircraft carriers with 300 planes.

Nov. 20—1 Israeli jet is shot down during an Israeli attack on a pro-Syrian Palestinian base east of Beirut.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See *Intl, Arms Control; Germany, West; Italy*)

Organization of American States (OAS)

Nov. 14—At the annual OAS meeting, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam says that the U.S. invasion of Grenada was justified because it was stopping anarchy, not altering a legitimate political system.

Nov. 15—The representatives of Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Suriname and Uruguay criticize the U.S. for invading Grenada, calling it a violation of the U.N. and the OAS charters.

Palestinian Crisis

Nov. 3—Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat claims that rebel members of his organization backed by Libyan and Syrian forces are at-

tacking his bases, Beddawi and Nahr al Bared, 2 refugee camps near Tripoli.

Nov. 6—Nahr al Bared falls to rebel PLO forces.

Nov. 9—Meeting in Doha, Qatar, the 6-nation Gulf Cooperation Council ends its conference after failing to get an agreement for a cease-fire between the warring factions of the PLO.

Nov. 11—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko ends 2 days of talks in Moscow with Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam; Gromyko stresses the "urgent need to overcome the strife and restore unity in the ranks of the Palestinian resistance movement. . . ."

Nov. 16—Palestinian rebels claim to have taken Arafat's stronghold of Beddawi just north of Tripoli.

Nov. 19—Fighting for control of Beddawi spreads to areas of Tripoli.

Nov. 21—Rebel forces cut Arafat off from Beddawi and corner his forces in Tripoli. The rebel forces declare a unilateral cease-fire.

Nov. 28—Talks begin in Damascus aimed at the withdrawal of the rival PLO factions from Tripoli, a city of 600,000.

United Nations (U.N.)

(See also *Israel*)

Nov. 2—The General Assembly approves a resolution that "deeply deplores" the U.S. invasion of Grenada.

Nov. 7—The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization reports that emergency aid must be sent to 22 African nations immediately in order to avert famine.

Nov. 11—The General Assembly approves a resolution that calls for an end to "acts of aggression" against Nicaragua and the encouragement of democratic systems in Central America.

Nov. 16—Voting 87 to 9, the General Assembly approves a resolution that calls for negotiations between Argentina and Great Britain on the sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

Nov. 18—Voting 13 to 1, the Security Council rejects the legal validity of a new Turkish Cypriot republic in Cyprus; Pakistan casts the sole negative vote.

ARGENTINA

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Nov. 8—President-elect Raúl Alfonsín names an 8-member Cabinet; the new government will take office on Dec. 10.

Nov. 15—A federal judge indicts and puts under preventive detention the former head of the State Intelligence Agency for "illicit association" with right-wing terror groups.

Nov. 18—Rear Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, president of the National Atomic Energy Commission, says that Argentina has the capability to make enriched uranium, giving it the ability to make nuclear explosives.

BANGLADESH

Nov. 14—Military ruler Lieutenant General H.M. Ershad says that elections will take place on Nov. 25, 1984; Ershad came to power in March, 1982.

BOLIVIA

Nov. 21—About 13,000 workers march through La Paz to protest austerity measures imposed by the government; basic food prices have been increased by as much as 46.5 to 79 percent.

BRAZIL

Nov. 18—Planning Minister Antônio Delfim Netto says that he has reached agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on limiting austerity measures in Brazil; Brazil is to limit its inflation rate to 75 percent, not 55 percent as earlier requested.

BURMA

Nov. 4—The government says that it has "firmly established" that North Korean agents were responsible for the bomb attack last month that killed 17 visiting South Korean officials.

CANADA

Nov. 13—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau returns from a tour of West European nations; he reports broad support for his recent proposal calling for talks among the 5 nations possessing nuclear weapons.

Nov. 28—Prime Minister Trudeau meets with Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang in Beijing to discuss Trudeau's nuclear arms control plan.

CHAD

Nov. 25—The government announces that a reconciliation meeting between the government and the rebels trying to topple the government will be held soon in Ethiopia; no date has been set.

CHINA

(See also *Canada, U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 6—Zhou Yang, chairman of the state-controlled China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, offers a "self-criticism" in the *Guangming Daily*; his apology is part of a government drive against "spiritual pollution" from the West.

Nov. 25—Communist party leader Hu Yaobang addresses the Japanese Diet.

Gogiang Yang, a diplomatic courier, asks for political asylum while on a visit to the U.S.

Nov. 26—Party leader Hu says that U.S. President Ronald Reagan's April visit to China might have to be cancelled because of a recent U.S. Senate resolution that affirmed Taiwan's right to free determination.

CUBA

(See also *Grenada; Nicaragua*)

Nov. 2—President Fidel Castro welcomes home 57 Cubans wounded in fighting with U.S. soldiers on Grenada.

Nov. 14—Castro says that the invasion of Grenada by the U.S. was made possible because those who killed Grenada's Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, "sank the revolution."

CYPRUS

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Greece; Turkey; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 15—Rauf Denktash, head of the Turkish Cypriots in northern Cyprus, announces that northern Cyprus is an independent republic; President Spyros Kyprianou condemns the action and calls for international action to reverse it.

Nov. 26—Denktash asks for a review of the deployment of U.N. troops on Cyprus; he charges that the U.S. has coerced Islamic nations into refraining from recognizing his state.

EIRE

(See *U.K., Great Britain*)

EL SALVADOR

(See also *Nicaragua; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 17—Residents of 3 northern towns tell journalists that on Nov. 4, Salvadoran soldiers killed more than 100 men, women and children; the government says those who were killed were "leftist sympathizers."
Nov. 25—U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas R. Pickering says that continued inaction by the government on death squad activity could lead to a cutoff of U.S. aid.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis; Iran*)

- Nov. 7—Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson tells Parliament that 5 French-built jets arrived in Iraq on October 8.

GERMANY, WEST

- Nov. 21—About 3,000 people demonstrate outside the Bundestag as parliamentary debate begins on allowing the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Germany.
Nov. 22—Voting 286 to 226, the Bundestag approves a plan allowing the deployment of NATO Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in West Germany; a government spokesman says that deployment will begin tomorrow.
Nov. 29—Economics Minister Otto Lambsdorff is indicted on bribery charges; Lambsdorff is accused of helping the giant Flick corporation receive favorable tax treatment in return for \$50,000.

GREECE

- Nov. 15—A U.S. Navy officer is assassinated by 2 gunmen.
The government condemns the formation of an independent Turkish Cypriot republic.
Nov. 16—The government announces that it will break off all talks with Turkey if Turkey does not withdraw its recognition of the new republic on Cyprus.

GRENADA

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Cuba; U.K., Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

- Nov. 1—300 U.S. Marines land on an island 20 miles from Grenada; they leave after detaining 17 men who allegedly belong to the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army.
The Cuban government reports that its embassy on Grenada is surrounded by U.S. military personnel and that all Cuban personnel have been ordered off the island by Nov. 3 by Governor General Sir Paul Scoon.
Nov. 2—The U.S. Defense Department says that "hostilities have ceased" on Grenada.
Nov. 3—Sir Paul announces at a news conference that elections will be held in 6 months.
Nov. 4—The U.S. government makes public what it says are translations of documents showing that 5 secret military agreements with Communist bloc nations were signed by the government of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.
All the members of the Soviet Union's embassy leave the island; Sir Paul ordered the Russians expelled yesterday.
Nov. 6—Meredith Alister McIntyre, a former secretary general of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, says that he accepts Sir Paul's request to head an interim government until elections are held.
Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga says that

Grenada's military leader was warned about the U.S. invasion at least 36 hours before it occurred.

- Nov. 9—Sir Paul names 9 people to an "advisory council" that will serve as an interim government; Meredith Alister McIntyre is named head of the council.
Nov. 14—U.S. officials say that the 148 prisoners still being held in an U.S. detention camp will be released in 2 days; since the invasion more than 1,130 Cubans and Grenadians have been interrogated at the camp by the U.S. military.
Nov. 16—U.S. President Ronald Reagan's administration announces that all U.S. military forces will be withdrawn from the island of Grenada by Dec. 23.
Nov. 22—A U.S. Army spokesman says that 1,200 U.S. military personnel have left in the last 2 days; there are still 3,100 U.S. soldiers on the island.

GUATEMALA

- Nov. 1—Labor Minister Otto Palma Figueroa resigns.
Nov. 8—Brigadier General Oscar Mejía Victores, the government's Chief Executive, says that he has expelled several Catholic missionaries for "subversive affairs."

HONDURAS

- Nov. 18—About 1,200 U.S. Marines and 500 Honduran soldiers land on the northern shore as part of a 6-month-long U.S. military maneuver in Honduras; there are about 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Honduras for the exercise.

INDIA

(See *Intl, Commonwealth Conference*)

INDONESIA

- Nov. 11—The Indonesian Legal Aid Institute, a human rights organization in Jakarta, says that at least 2,000 people have been killed by death squads in the last 11 months.

IRAN

(See also *Intl, Iran-Iraq War; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 10—The French Foreign Ministry announces that Iran has asked the French to close the commercial section of their embassy in Teheran; embassy officials also report that the Iranian government has told its citizens not to buy French goods.

IRAQ

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War; France*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 2—Following 2 days of student protests, the Israeli army closes Bethlehem University on the occupied West Bank for 2 months.
Nov. 12—Border police kill 2 Palestinian youths during a rock-throwing incident on the occupied West Bank; 4 other youths are wounded.
Nov. 16—Speaking at the U.N., President Chaim Herzog asks all Arab countries to negotiate their differences with Israel; almost half the U.N. delegates boycott the speech.
Nov. 30—In a speech in Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir says that the new political-military understanding between the U.S. and Israel will help restore Lebanon's independence.

ITALY

- Nov. 16—The Chamber of Deputies votes 351 to 219, with 1 abstention, to approve the deployment of NATO cruise missiles supplied by the U.S. in Sicily.
 Nov. 27—The Defense Ministry announces that the 1st components for the 112 cruise missiles have arrived.

JAMAICA(See also *Grenada*)

- Nov. 26—Prime Minister Edward Seaga announces that elections will be held on Dec. 15, 2 years early.

JAPAN(See also *China; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 28—Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone dissolves the Diet; general elections will be held on Dec. 18.

KOREA, NORTH(See *Burma*)**KOREA, SOUTH**(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 11—The government puts more than 100 political opponents under house arrest or surveillance in preparation for the visit of U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

LEBANON(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis, Palestinian Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 28—President Amin Gemayel arrives in Italy for talks with Prime Minister Bettino Craxi.

LIBYA(See *Intl, Palestinian Crisis*)**NICARAGUA**(See also *Intl, CONDECA; U.S., Legislation*)

- Nov. 6—Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo says that demonstrations by government supporters at Catholic churches forced worshippers to endure "an afternoon of hell."
 Nov. 23—In an interview, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, coordinator of the ruling junta, says that the government is prepared to send home all foreign military advisers and stop buying arms if all other Central American nations do so also.
 Nov. 24—*The New York Times* reports that the government has asked Salvadoran rebel leaders in Managua to leave the country by the end of November.
 Nov. 26—The government announces that it has ordered 1,000 Cuban military advisers to leave Nicaragua in the next week; 1,200 Cubans have already left.

PAKISTAN(See *Intl, U.N.*)**PERU**

- Nov. 13—Prime Minister Fernando Schwalb says that the left-wing opposition "has triumphed" in today's municipal elections.

PHILIPPINES

- Nov. 21—President Ferdinand Marcos's ruling party, the New Society Movement, announces that it has decided to restore the post of Vice President.
 Imelda Marcos, the wife of the President, announces that she would not try to succeed her husband if he were incapacitated.
 Nov. 26—The Roman Catholic bishops of the Philip-

pines issue a letter warning Marcos of anarchy if the government's credibility is not restored.

POLAND(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 18—The government tells Jozef Cardinal Glemp, the Roman Catholic Primate, to silence 69 "antisocialist" priests; the government says that the priests will be arrested if no action is taken by Cardinal Glemp.
 Nov. 20—Lech Walesa, head of the banned trade union Solidarity, calls for a "struggle" against the government's attempt to increase the price of food.
 Nov. 22—Janusz Obodowski, head of the Planning Commission, is dismissed by military ruler General Wojciech Jaruzelski; Obodowski is held responsible for recent food shortages and other economic problems.
 Nov. 29—The government announces that Lech Walesa's wife Danuta will be allowed to travel to Norway to accept the Nobel peace prize won by her husband.

ROMANIA

- Nov. 25—The official press agency reports that the Communist party's Central Committee has issued a statement deploring the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union and the U.S. in Europe.

SOUTH AFRICA

- Nov. 3—It is reported from Pretoria that almost 66 percent of the people voting in yesterday's referendum approved proposals for the new constitution that will allow colored (Indian and mixed race) people political representation in a segregated Parliament.

SURINAME

- Nov. 29—Sergeant Major Marcel Zeeuw, deputy commander of the military police, says that an attempted coup has been crushed and 10 people have been arrested.

SYRIA(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis, Palestinian Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 7—The government has ordered all reservists to report for military duty at once.
 Nov. 19—Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas says that Syria's armed forces are prepared to launch suicide attacks on U.S. warships off Lebanon.
 Nov. 23—Government-controlled newspapers publish government statements that reject the U.S. charge that Syria masterminded the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters.

TUNISIA

- Nov. 19—President Habib Bourguiba legalizes 2 new political parties; he announces plans to establish a multiparty system. Only 2 parties have been allowed in recent years.

TURKEY(See also *Cyprus; Greece*)

- Nov. 7—The Motherland party wins 212 of the 400 seats in the Parliament in today's elections, the 1st in 3 years. The Populist party wins 117 seats and the Nationalist Democracy party, 71. Under a constitution approved earlier, General Kenan Evren will remain President until 1989.
 Nov. 11—The military government extends martial law

for another 4 months; the newly elected Parliament, which will convene on Nov. 24, is empowered to lift martial law.

Nov. 12—The military government approves a press censorship law that prescribes long prison sentences for the publication of articles that threaten national security or offend public morality.

Nov. 15—The military government recognizes the newly declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; Turkey is the only nation to recognize the republic.

Nov. 24—The new Parliament convenes for the 1st time; Turgut Ozal, head of the Motherland party, is the Prime Minister-elect.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Arms Control, Palestinian Crisis; Grenada; Romania; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 7—President Yuri V. Andropov misses the annual Revolution Day parade; he has been reported to be ill.

Nov. 16—Leonid Kostandov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-West German Economic Commission, tells reporters that the Soviet Union's grain harvest this year will exceed 200 million metric tons, the largest harvest in 5 years.

Nov. 18—The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) releases a report showing that Soviet military spending has grown about 2 percent a year; earlier estimates had placed the growth in military spending at 4 to 5 percent a year.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Nov. 7—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warns the U.S. that retaliatory action for the bombing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon or a U.S. decision to lift its embargo on arms sales to Argentina could further damage relations with Britain.

Thatcher meets with Eire's Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald in London for talks on improving relations between the two countries.

Nov. 14—The government announces that the 1st shipment of U.S.-made cruise missiles has arrived.

Nov. 28—Minister for Overseas Development Timothy Raison tells the House of Commons that the government has decided to grant Grenada \$1 million in aid immediately.

Northern Ireland

Nov. 30—3 Protestants are killed in a church when gunmen enter with automatic weapons and begin firing; 7 others are wounded.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Nov. 8—The Federal Communications Commission rules that radio and television broadcasters are free to stage political debates between candidates of their own choosing without providing equal time for all registered candidates with opposing points of view.

Nov. 21—In a White House ceremony, William Clark is sworn in as Secretary of the Interior.

Nov. 25—The White House declines to say how long increased security measures in and around the White House will remain in effect.

Nov. 30—White House spokesman Larry Speakes voices administration criticism of chairman of the Council of

Economic Advisers Martin Feldstein, who outspokenly disagrees with administration economic policy.

Economy

Nov. 4—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate fell to 8.7 percent in October.

Nov. 10—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.3 percent in October.

Nov. 23—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.4 percent in October.

Nov. 29—The New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones industrial average reaches a new closing high of 1,287.20.

The Commerce Department reports a record foreign trade deficit of \$8.97 billion in October.

Nov. 30—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.8 percent in October.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Arms Control, CONDECA, Lebanon Crisis, OAS, U.N.; China; Cuba; Cyprus; El Salvador; Germany, West; Greece; Grenada; Honduras; Israel; Korea, South; Syria; U.S.S.R.; U.K., Great Britain*)

Nov. 2—White House spokesman Larry Speakes announces that Poland will be allowed to renew discussions with American fishing companies about fishing rights in American waters; he says that the U.S. will join other countries to discuss rescheduling Poland's \$11-billion debt to Western nations. The actions remove sanctions imposed in December, 1981.

Nov. 3—In a White House briefing, President Ronald Reagan calls the U.S. invasion of Grenada on Oct. 25 "a rescue mission."

Nov. 8—President Reagan leaves on a 7-day trip to Japan and South Korea.

Nov. 10—Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan announces a U.S.-Japanese agreement to strengthen the value of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar.

Nov. 11—Addressing the Japanese Diet, President Reagan calls on Japan to join the U.S. in a "powerful partnership for good."

Nov. 12—President Reagan arrives in Seoul, South Korea; addressing Parliament, he denounces North Korea and assures South Korea that it is not "alone."

Nov. 14—President Reagan returns to Washington, D.C.

Nov. 15—State Department spokesman Alan Romberg says that the U.S. condemns "the move by the Turkish Cypriots to declare their independence."

Nov. 16—Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle declares that the "death squads of the violent right" in El Salvador must be restrained.

Nov. 21—In an order issued under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Treasury Department bans the import of nickel from the Soviet Union, effective in 30 days, unless the Soviet Union can guarantee that none of the nickel it sells the U.S. comes from Cuba.

Nov. 22—In Washington, D.C., President Reagan meets with Israeli President Chaim Herzog.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger claims that Iranians, with the "sponsorship and authority of the Syrian government," were responsible for the bombing attack on the U.S. Marines at Beirut Airport October 23.

Nov. 23—The White House announces a \$30-million long-term aid package for Grenada.

Nov. 28—White House spokesman Larry Speakes says that President Reagan recognizes "the People's Re-

public of China as the sole legitimate government" of China and that the President still expects to visit China in April, 1984.

Nov. 29—At the close of 2 days of talks in Washington, D.C., President Reagan and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir announce the formation of a U.S.-Israeli committee to coordinate political and military cooperation between the two countries.

The State Department refuses U.S. travel visas to Nicaragua's Interior Minister Tomás Borge and the president of the Salvadoran Constituent Assembly, Roberto d'Aubuisson.

Nov. 30—President Reagan meets with Lebanon's President Amin Gemayel in Washington, D.C.

Legislation

Nov. 1—Voting 403 to 23, the House approves legislation to apply the War Powers Resolution to the invasion of Grenada. The bill goes to conference.

Nov. 2—President Ronald Reagan signs a bill establishing the 3d Monday in January as a federal holiday, starting in 1986, to honor the birthday of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.

Nov. 7—In a 56 to 37 vote, the Senate gives final congressional approval to funds for the production of the MX missile and the B-1 bomber.

Nov. 15—The House votes 278 to 147 to approve the Equal Rights Amendment; this is 6 votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to send the amendment to the states for their approval.

Nov. 18—In a 226-186 vote, the House approves an \$8.4-billion increase in U.S. support for the International Monetary Fund; the Senate approved the measure November 17 in a 67-30 vote.

In voice votes the Senate and House approve a military appropriations bill of about \$250 billion; included is some \$24 million in covert military aid for Nicaraguan guerrillas.

In a 71-18 vote, the Senate approves the nomination of William P. Clark as Secretary of the Interior.

The Senate and House approve a bill that will pay dairy farmers to reduce milk production.

The Senate and House approve legislation authorizing funds for intelligence operations in fiscal 1984.

The Senate and House authorize \$3.24 billion in funds for the State Department in fiscal 1984.

In a 214-186 vote, the House completes congressional action raising the U.S. federal debt ceiling to \$1.49 million million (\$1.49 trillion).

The 98th Congress ends its 1st session.

Nov. 22—President Reagan signs a bill authorizing programs for the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency; the bill contains a rider that postpones until April 15, 1984, consideration of administration efforts to establish a system of lifelong censorship for officials handling sensitive information.

Nov. 28—President Reagan signs a \$10.5-billion appropriations bill to fund the State, Commerce and Justice Departments; the bill also extends the life of the Legal Services Corporation.

Nov. 29—President Ronald Reagan signs the so-called diversion program bill which for the first time pays farmers not to produce milk.

Nov. 30—President Reagan pocket vetoes a bill that would have required him to certify to Congress every 6 months that El Salvador is continuing to improve its human rights and land reform programs in order to continue to receive U.S. military aid.

President Reagan signs a bill establishing a reconstituted 8-member Commission on Civil Rights; 4 members are to be appointed by the President and 4 by Congress.

Military

Nov. 23—The Defense Department reports that in the fiscal year ending September 30, all services met their recruiting goals with well-educated recruits.

Politics

Nov. 3—Civil rights leader Jesse Jackson declares himself a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984.

Science and Space

Nov. 28—With 6 astronauts and a space laboratory aboard, the space shuttle *Columbia* lifts off on a planned 9-day mission in space.

Supreme Court

Nov. 1—In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court overrules the Hawaii Supreme Court and upholds the Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973, which prevents states from taxing the gross income of airlines and levying departure taxes.

In a unanimous decision, the Court upholds a ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that permits the government to seize the illegal gains of convicted racketeers.

URUGUAY

Nov. 27—In a protest authorized by the military government, over 300,000 people demonstrate in Montevideo for a return to democracy.

VANUATU

Nov. 3—Results from yesterday's election show that the ruling party of Prime Minister Walter Lini has retained enough seats to remain in power.

ZIMBABWE

Nov. 1—The government announces that it arrested former Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa last night because of his suspected "subversive" links with South Africa.


Nov. 4—The government says that it has imposed strict restrictions on all reporters working in Matabeleland. ■

PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON

(Continued from page 42)

to the federal government, but they would continue to live on their own. Lebanon would enjoy only limited sovereignty, and its policies would continue to require the consensus or sanction of its two more powerful neighbors. But that is probably all that can be expected in the near future.

At this writing, the recognition that the United States is perhaps the only power capable of brokering an agreement among the various Lebanese and non-Lebanese parties has once again rallied hopes for a peaceful resolution of the Lebanese crisis. Nonetheless, challenges remain herculean. ■



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